Backstories & Backbones; Security of US Emergency Alert System (EAS) is crap & spoof zombie apocalypses not very difficult apparently; #OpNSA NSA PRISM tunnel servers may be getting noticed; Joe Naccio & NSA revisited
Oh For Facks Sake. All this big government/police state techno-crap is so often easily hacked in some way, which means the Awesome Emergency Powers of Teh Govmints are easily subverted by the Baba Booey fans of the world, or zombie apocalypses as the case may be. Indeed quite possibly all this NSA crap is starting to get hacked (and not just by activists but cynical commercial weasels) and since it's all backdoored to everything and everyone's mom, everyone gets screwed. Well played. Truth tellers keep publishing before it's too late :/
Much of this is old news but why not batch some of it in one place?
On the newer lulz front at least some people are claiming to poke around including determining which servers run in-between points for PRISM mass surveillance for the NSA. And I don't know anything about these IOActive guys who posted on the EAS hack but they seem worth keeping an eye on….
Before the EAS info, here is a good place to look at alternative, well polished and much open source apps : https://prism-break.org/ - bookmark this and use it when setting up any new computer :)
Emergency Alert System Fail: Also covered in ars technica. See this video's crazy audio message for hacked Montana Emergency Alert System clip from this February: http://gawker.com/5983516/montana-tv-stations-emergency-alert-system-hac...
So more or less a main contractor mailed out the damn master login keys to their products controlling the national Emergency Alert System, exactly the opposite of what you're supposed to do.
Clearly in the event of some adverse network screwing with things, it will probably be a mess. Let's say a Jimmy Carter tries to cut off SAIC and Blackwater, triggering an epic new Iran Contra type Ollie North conspiracy scene -- all these dumb horrible systems like the EAS DASDEC will behave horribly.
Global PR Manager, IOActive, Inc.
T: +1 206 462 2291
IOActive Uncovers Vulnerabilities in United States Emergency Alerting System
Digital Alerting Systems DASDEC application servers found to be vulnerable to remote attack
Seattle, WA ― July 8, 2013 ― IOActive, Inc., a leading provider of application security, compliance and smart grid security services, today announced that is has discovered vulnerabilities in the Emergency Alerting System (EAS) which is widely used by TV and radio stations across the United States.
IOActive's principal research scientist, Mike Davis, uncovered the vulnerabilities in the digital alerting systems - DASDEC - application servers. The DASDEC receives and authenticates EAS messages. Once a station receives and authenticates the message, the DASDEC interrupts the broadcast and overlays the message onto the broadcast with the alert tone containing some information about the event. The affected devices are the DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II appliances.
“Earlier this year we were shown an example of an intrusion on the EAS when the Montana Television Network's regular programming was interrupted by news of a zombie apocalypse. Although there was no zombie apocalypse, it did highlight just how vulnerable the system is,” said Mike Davis, principal research scientist for IOActive. “These DASDEC application servers are currently shipped with their root privileged SSH key as part of the firmware update package. This key allows an attacker to remotely log on in over the Internet and can manipulate any system function. For example, they could disrupt a station's ability to transmit and could disseminate false emergency information. For any of these issues to be resolved, we believe that re-engineering needs to be done on the digital alerting system side and firmware updates to be pushed to all appliances.”
The EAS is designed to enable to the President of the United States to speak to US citizens within 10-minutes of a disaster occurring. In the past these alerts were passed from station to station using the Associate Press (AP) or United Press International (UPI) “wire services” which connected to television and radio stations around the US. Whenever the station received an authenticated Emergency Action Notification (EAN), the station would disrupt its current broadcast to deliver the message to the public. On Wednesday 26 June, the Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) published an advisory providing details of the vulnerability.
IOActive has also issued its own IOActive Labs Advisory outlining the affected products, the impact and the solution.
Established in 1998, IOActive is an industry leader that offers comprehensive computer security services with specialisations in smart grid technologies, software assurance, and compliance. Boasting a well-rounded and diverse clientele, IOActive works with a majority of Global 500 companies including power and utility, hardware, retail, financial, media, aerospace, healthcare, high-tech, and software development organizations. As a home for highly skilled and experienced professionals, IOActive attracts talented consultants who contribute to the growing body of security knowledge by speaking at such elite conferences as Black Hat, Ruxcon, Defcon, BlueHat, CanSec, and WhatTheHack. For more information, visit www.ioactive.com.
Monroe Electronics DASDEC Compromised Root SSH Key
Original release date: July 03, 2013
This advisory provides mitigation details for a vulnerability that impacts the Monroe Electronics DASDEC.
Mike Davis, a researcher with IOActive, reported a compromised root SSH key vulnerability to CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC). This vulnerability is in Monroe Electronics DASDEC‑I and DASDEC-II appliances. ICS-CERT coordinated with CERT/CC and Monroe Electronics to resolve the vulnerability. Monroe Electronics has produced an update that mitigates this vulnerability.
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
The following Monroe Electronics products are affected:
An attacker who exploits this vulnerability could gain root access to the device and affect the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the system.
Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to each organization. ICS‑CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture, and product implementation.
Monroe Electronics is a US-based company that maintains offices and research facilities in Lyndonville, New York. Monroe Electronics develops and distributes worldwide electrostatic measuring instruments including electrostatic voltmeters, electrostatic field meters, coulomb meters, and resistivity meters.
The affected products, DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II are emergency alert system (EAS) encoder/decoder (endec) devices that are used to broadcast EAS messages over digital and analog channels. According to Monroe Electronics, DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II are deployed across broadcast radio and television in the communication sector. Monroe Electronics estimates that these products are used primarily in the United States.
COMPROMISED ROOT SSH KEYhttp://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html, Web site last accessed July 03, 2013." href="http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-184-02#footnotea_ixegenr" name="footnoterefa_ixegenr">a
DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II had publicly available firmware images for these devices that included a private SSH key that authorizes remote logins to the devices. For software versions prior to 2.0-2, where the default SSH keys have not already been changed, an attacker can then log into a device with root privileges.
CVE-2013-0137http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-0137, Web site last accessed July 03, 2013." href="http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-184-02#footnoteb_ya73jua" name="footnoterefb_ya73jua">b has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score of 10.0 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C).http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C, Web site last accessed July 03, 2013." href="http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-184-02#footnotec_6n5eegx" name="footnoterefc_6n5eegx">c
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
An attacker with a moderate skill level could exploit this vulnerability.
Monroe Electronics has produced a software update, Version 2.0-2 that resolves this vulnerability. DASDEC users can obtain the DASDEC v2.0-2 software update and release notes by contacting email@example.com.
ICS‑CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.
- Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices should not directly face the Internet.
- Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
- When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices, Web site last accessed July 03, 2013." href="http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-184-02#footnoted_t8orqgw" name="footnoterefd_t8orqgw">d ICS‑CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available in the ICS‑CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B—Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies,http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B, Web site last accessed July 03, 2013." href="http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-184-02#footnotee_wn76bab" name="footnoterefe_wn76bab">e that is available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page (http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS‑CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
Vulnerability Note VU#662676
Digital Alert Systems DASDEC and Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net firmware exposes private root SSH key
Digital Alert Systems DASDEC and Monroe Electronics One-Net E189 Emergency Alert System (EAS) devices exposed a shared private root SSH key in publicly available firmware images. An attacker with SSH access to a device could use the key to log in with root privileges.
The Digital Alert Systems DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II and Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net/R189SE One-NetSE are Linux-based EAS encoder/decoder (ENDEC) devices that are used to broadcast EAS messages over digital and analog channels. IOActive has reported several security issues affecting these devices. The most severe of these issues is the public disclosure of the default private root SSH key. The less severe issues could also contribute to an attacker's ability to compromise a vulnerable device.
Compromised root SSH key (CVE-2013-0137)
Publicly available firmware images for these devices included a private root SSH key that was authorized to log in to the devices (CWE-798, CWE-321). The fingerprint for the compromised SSH key is 0c:89:49:f7:62:d2:98:f0:27:75:ad:e9:72:2c:68:c3. Although this key is not hard-coded, it may be impractical for less technical users to manually disable or change they key prior to firmware version 2.0-2.
Predictable session ID
IOActive reports that the administrative web server uses a predictable, monotonically increasing session ID. This finding is based on running the web server in a test environment. Testing on a variety of firmware versions on devices both at the factory and in the field, Monroe Electronics could not reproduce this finding.
Log information disclosure
Logs available via the web server provide a variety of information about the configuration, operation, and status of the device (CWE-532). Some of the log information is public and may be required by regulation.
Predictable password generation
The dasdec_mkuser script generates passwords in a deterministic way (CWE-341), however these passwords are not for administrative access, and the script is not used for general user account configuration.
Like many similar devices, the DASDEC and One-Net ENDECs use default administrative credentials. Some sites fail to change the default administrative password and allow unrestricted internet access.
An attacker with the private key and SSH access can log in to a device with root privileges.
Predictable session IDs could allow an attacker to take control of an existing administrative web session.
Predictable and unchanged default passwords can allow an attacker to log in to a device with root privileges. Devices exposed to the internet are at particularly high risk, for example, see Secure EAS Codecs Prevent Zombie Attacks and US-CERT Alert TA13-175A.
Logs may disclose configuration information that can benefit an attacker.
Apply an update
On April 24, 2013, Monroe Electronics and Digital Alert Systems released firmware version 2.0-2 that disables the compromised SSH key, provides a simplified user option to install new unique keys, and enforces a new password policy. Monroe Electronics has taken considerable effort to provide update information to DASDEC and One-NetSE users.
DASDEC users can obtain updated firmware and release notes by contacting <firstname.lastname@example.org>. R189 One-Net users can contact <email@example.com>.
Disable compromised SSH key
The compromised root SSH key should be disabled immediately, especially if the SSH service is exposed to untrusted networks such as the internet. If SSH connectivity is required, generate, install, and test new SSH keys before disabling the compromised key. The fingerprint for the compromised SSH key is 0c:89:49:f7:62:d2:98:f0:27:75:ad:e9:72:2c:68:c3.
Manually inspect SSH keys
To identify a compromised key, examine the authorized_keys file at /root/.ssh/authorized_keys2.dasdec and use the ssh-keygen command to show SSH key fingerprints. The following example shows the fingerprint for the compromised key:
$ ssh-keygen -l -f authorized_keys2.dasdec
1024 0c:89:49:f7:62:d2:98:f0:27:75:ad:e9:72:2c:68:c3 wood@endec1 (DSA)
Note that ssh-keygen only shows the fingerprint for the first key/line in the file. If authorized_keys2.dasdec contains multiple keys (multiple lines, one key per line), it will be necessary to extract each key (line) to a separate file and run the ssh-keygen command on each key/file. These shell scripts can be used to list and test multiple SSH keys in an authorized_keys file:
To generate new SSH keys, use ssh-kegen.
If for some reason you are not able to remove and replace the compromised SSH key, restrict access to the SSH service to highly trusted hosts and networks only. As a general good security practice, restrict access to all services to trusted hosts and networks.
Change default passwords
Change any default passwords, and do not deploy production systems without changing default passwords. Search engines like Shodan can index systems exposed to the internet and default passwords are usually documented and well-known. It is often trivial for an attacker to identify and access systems on the internet using default passwords.
#OpNSA: Some infos has been coming out about possible probing into the NSA PRISM system. Here are copies of some pastebins about all this. Start here: https://twitter.com/Op_NSA . It is indeed branded Anonymous and they said that two anons got searched over the weekend. What's cooking? Will the now-more-infamous NSA Q Group catch these cats?
#OpNSA claiming to have doxed some NSA officials and posting their phone numbers on interwebs. Something big may be taking off here -- if it turns out to be a honeypot there still better be lulz!
Greetings Citizens of the World, we are Anonymous. It is understood that the recent exposé of the national security agency has angered you. Anger caused by the realization that your own elected representatives promised to vote for your best interests but changed their minds when the price was right, in favor of increased surveillance on your normal everyday life. You hate them for voting your freedom and privacy away, and you have every right to. There are those that say you have nothing to fear if you have nothing to hide, but these are the same people who won’t tell you any of their own personal information upon your request. Complacent cowards like these have made it easier for this enormous surveillance operation to come to fruition. Eventually enough legislation will pass in favor of the evolving police state that will make every citizen a potential terrorist by default, and the NSA is at the core of it all. But you wonder to yourself, what can be done about all of this injustice and corruption? The answer is simple. Raise your voice so loud that no one can ignore it. Create such an overwhelming public outcry that the government and the media will be forced to acknowledge the issue. We need to show those directly responsible for all of this that there will be consequences for betraying us, and it will be the last time they do. In accordance with this we will be initiating stage two of operation national security agency and releasing the personal information of one politician each week that slandered Edward Snowden as a criminal and was involved with supporting the NSA and PRISM. We will make visible to everyone the depth of their violations against our freedom, privacy and well-being. We will expose the precise amount of money it took for them to turn their backs on us and we will show them how it feels to have their privacy abused and their personal information mined, collected and analyzed. But we won’t stop there. Since this affects not just Americans but everyone around the world, it is only right that we give this information as much exposure as possible. Spam the emails of your local representatives voicing your opposition to these surveillance measures along with president obama. Spread flyers regarding the NSA’s data mining and organize protests to inform the public. We will all need to work together in spreading this information as far and wide as we can so that the world is fully aware of what has been orchestrated at their expense. We are all in this together and have an obligation to awaken the masses to see how their rights are being stripped away one by one leaving themselves, their friends, their family and their children vulnerable to government manipulation and control. This will spark an awakening that cannot be stopped.
We are Anonymous.
We are Legion.
We do not forgive.
We do not forget.
This one is interesting, I don't know why anyone would trust any VPN in particular tho :/
http://pastebin.com/BzN9aUkq By: luminary on Jun 29th, 2013 | OpNSA VPN services.
Want to defeat PRISM?
Do you like the idea of free internet usage?
Well here is a list of Virtual Private Network providers recommended by Anonymous.
These services claim explicitly in their Terms of Service that they don't keep connection
logs on their customers, though it's always best to do some SERIOUS digging into a company's
history before you commit your freedom.
If you don't plan on doing anything illegal and you're merely trying to avoid snoopers
or circumvent censorship, free VPNs will likely suffice, but if you're going for a more
shady flavor of activism, don't leave home without these.
All of these accept Bitcoin, so that's a very helpful attribute. Bitcoin is a highly secure
payment method used if you don't want people to know who you are when you buy things over the internet.
Private Internet Access VPN
http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy By: luminary on Jul 7th, 2013 | syntax: None | size: 2.45 KB | hits: 2,365 | expires: Never
PRETENTIOUS MINIATURE PRESS RELEASE:
Greetings, National "Security" Agency -- and our followers whom we love so much:
This may look like a small release, but it's actually huge. See, we hacked the NSA yet again because we just love doing that. These are DNS tunnels that are sending encrypted data to and from the PRISM databases. We have the IP's of those servers. If you crash these servers with DDoS, you literally render PRISM "broken". We are also planning to release some of that data (which we have access to) if we can decrypt it. So anyway. Hit these -- you hit PRISM. And die in the Matrix, you die in real life, etc etc.
SLIGHTLY TECHNICAL INFORMATION THAT MEANS NOTHING TO A LOT OF PEOPLE:
ns3-194.akamaiedge.net 56923 IN A 126.96.36.199
lar7.akamaiedge.net 64613 IN A 188.8.131.52
la11.akamaiedge.net 90000 IN A 184.108.40.206
lac1.akamaiedge.net 90000 IN A 220.127.116.11
la6.akamaiedge.net 70352 IN A 18.104.22.168
ns6-194.akamaiedge.net 90000 IN A 22.214.171.124
ns7-194.akamaiedge.net 90000 IN A 126.96.36.199
lar2.akamaiedge.net 84886 IN A 188.8.131.52
la1.akamaiedge.net 53942 IN A 184.108.40.206
lar6.akamaiedge.net 54809 IN A 220.127.116.11
la7.akamaiedge.net 39448 IN A 18.104.22.168
ns5-194.akamaiedge.net 35282 IN A 22.214.171.124
la3.akamaiedge.net 39672 IN A 126.96.36.199
R00tsh3ll - @r00tsh3ll1 (twitter)
Intro Written and Info PASTED by:
Luminary - @aluminary (twitter)
There's TONS more information to release. We're going through some folders to see what we can and can't release before July 11th, 2013 (DDoS day). There's more to come. For those that have been asking for "proof of a hack", we're releasing some more as we go, but remember: this is the NSA. We have to be very careful about what goes public before we're done actually UTILIZING that information. For those that are understanding of this, you are the people that will receive the best information first! ^___^
http://pastebin.com/X3siNZRC By: luminary on Jul 8th, 2013 | syntax: None | size: 3.64 KB | hits: 120 | expires: Never
Greetings, faithful supporters of Anonymous and haters of PRISM. We are Anonymous, and for a moment, we're going to take time off from destroying things we don't like and teach you how to secure yourself and hide your identity while online. Naturally, this will be a benefit to you in the long run. Most people have no doubt heard of “TOR”, or “The Onion Router”. In basic terms, Tor is a routing network that sends all of your internet traffic through many different nodes all scattered about around the world. So imagine you've got a message you want to pass to a friend who's standing 100 meters from you. Whereas your standard internet traffic would be like walking over to your friend and handing him that note, Tor puts many different people between you two. So rather, in this situation, you'd hand the note to one of those people, they'd pass it to a random person, who'd pass that on, again and again until it gets to your friend. This allows the actual source of the traffic to be hidden after it comes through the exit node. Fortunately, Tor is very easy to acquire.
It can be downloaded from here: https://www.torproject.org/
For windows users, that download comes with the Tor browser bundle, which, when used, routes all of your traffic through a series of nodes as mentioned previously. Likely Linux users will know how to properly configure a client or program to use Tor, so we won't waste their time.
Once downloaded, that package will come with Vidalia Control Panel, an .exe file which acts as a sort of mothership. Once opened, a socks5 proxy server will begin running on local host. Your computer is the only computer on the network that will be able to use it unless others are also running Tor. The Tor browser will begin running on its own, so all you'll really need to do once in that browser is simply start searching away like a pro. If you want to verify your privacy because of paranoia, you can visit cmyip.com while using the Tor browser and be assured that your real IP is in fact hidden.
Tor itself is generally considered trust worthy. The thing is, even if nodes are run by undesirable parties, not only would said parties have to own that node, but they'd have to own the entire random path to... well... backtrace you. A downside of this entire thing, though, is that Tor is a high latency network. Because your traffic is being routed all around, it's also a bit slower. You will certainly notice slower internet speeds in applications using Tor (regular browsers not on the proxy won't be any slower). Then again, such a trivial matter is certainly worth the amount of protection Tor will offer you. Tor is a widely used and completely free project available at the aforementioned link.
Remember though, nobody is completely invincible. And human error can play into your traffic, or worse, your identity, being revealed. If, however, you take precautions to make sure Tor is operating and so forth, you will be fine. One more downside of Tor – that is one of the reasons a lot of us use VPN services – is that it's blocked in a lot of places. Because it's so easy and so anonymous, many websites, services, IRCs and networks will block Tor Exit Nodes to eliminate or crack down on abuse. In these cases, you'll probably need special permission to use the Tor server, as is the case with the AnonOps IRC network, which is one widely used meeting place for Anons.
Stay Anonymous. Stay safe.
Keep it up and defeat PRISM. Together, we are strong.
Together, we are Legion.
^^You cannot use Tor with webchat. J/s
Something ought to be said here ^ about the importance of other tracking links in browsers, time attacks, recent tor vulnerabilities that have come up etc. More caution and other layers are pretty surely necessary. Stuff like Ghostery to block various web tracker bugs for example.
Another recent discussion http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jul/31
"I run 5 tor nodes. I can tell that 5 nodes on the network are save for me. Trust tor. I will not run dsniff or tcpdump. Its save. I will never abuse the logins you gave me for free. Afk now, that one guy is surfing on xhamster, nice video choice" -- "Alex"
Lol well put I suppose. Concise anyway.
Good tor network data source http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/
Router name agentAdrianLamo is doing well lol http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=ba7385668e2386246f2fb...
Tor vuln paper http://www.syverson.org/tor-vulnerabilities-iccs.pdf
also for listserv activity https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-censorship-events/
Tor activity very much logged by NSA as shown recently http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/06/24/using-tor-and-other-means-to-...
Anyway it's just a normal hesitation in pointing out that Tor or given VPNs are not magically perfect for sure. There are merits to both technologies but magic boxes they are not! Of course one should assume the FBI is listening closely to IPs like webchat.anonops.com etc. 188.8.131.52 & 184.108.40.206
For more on the Op_NSA situation check out
Email encryption in general:
For basics of encrypting email see Riseup.net: https://help.riseup.net/en/encrypting-email-with-thunderbird
Cryptome.org has had interesting stuff about PGP keys lately as well! http://cryptome.org/2013/07/mining-pgp-keyservers.htm & many posts on PGP keys registered to assorted federal departments! 2013-0744.htm 2013-0746.htm 2013-0741.htm etc
More backstories and Backbones:
Here is a possible explanation of the Company A / B / C listings in the NSA Inspector General report. MCI, AT&T & Sprint:
Date: Wed, 03 Jul 2013 16:05:20 -0400
From: "James M. Atkinson" <jmatk[at]tscm.com>
Organization: Granite Island Group
To: TSCM-L Mailingin List <tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com>
Subject: Presidents Surveillance Program of 14 September 2001
On September 14, 2001 the NSA initiated a program on eavesdropping of all or the telephone and internet traffic of all U.S. Citizens, and concealed this quite unlawful program under many layers of secrecy, not because it as in the interests of national security, but rather to hide the violation of the Fourth Amendment.
These are the "initial three backbones" that the NSA tapped into (with the consent of the companies, each of whom gave the NSA full, unrestricted access):
The attached PDF file is a list of all of the funds spent by the program... do the math, and closely observe the date ranges (they perfectly match up, to the day with all of the dates in the Snowden document leaks).
MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES INCORPORATED/MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELG COMPANY/AT&T
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
In the IG report these aforementioned companies at listed at Company A, B, and C.
There are four additional companies (and others) to include Verizon, Nextel, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, and so on.
See also procurement code: DAAB0701DH802 for Booze Allen Hamilton (Snowdens employer)
The project and procurement code as: DXXXXX01XXXXX
The program office as listed at:
2011 CRYSTAL DRIVE STE 911 (One Crystal Park Bldg "Crystal City 2" see also: http://cryptome.org/rummy-op2.htm)
ARLINGTON , VA , 22202-3732
19.1 Billion Dollar Series of Contract initiated on the same day that the president authorized the Presidents Surveillance System for the NSA, and ending on the day it as shutdown.
Using a DUNS# of 790238638
The persons name under whom this was all listed is:
GRAFTON THOMAS BIGLOW
1312 Rhode Island Ave NW
Washington, DC 20005
At the same address is:
Hope L Biglow
Grafton Bigelow is also listed at various addresses in:
Cape May, NJ and West Cape May, NJ
Plus several addresses in:
West Palm Beach, FL
But, the name Grafton Biglow also turns up:
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA CENTER
7th & D Street SW, Room 5652
Washington, DC 20407
Director: Mr. Graffton Biglow
Fax: (202) 401-1546
Internet e-mail: grafton.biglow[at]gsa.gov
Hopefully he had his own phone checked for bugs.
Maybe they can use the "Nuremberg defense"or claim "Befehl ist Befehl"
Very, very carefully look at the attached document, and take very deep and very slow breathes as you read it.
The bottom line is the Rainmaker system captured and indexed 1.17 racks per day of communications, bridging all major service providers, all fiber optic choke points, and eavesdropping mostly on U.S. Citizens (unlawfully) in what is called a "General Warrant" which is explicitly prohibited under U.S. Law.
The President of the United State is just a fucking moron, and utter and complete moron.
--- FUCK THE PIGS ---
James M. Atkinson. President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
Granite Island Group http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803 jmatk[at]tscm.com
Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.pdf (342pp, 679KB)
The NSA Naccio Qwest case!
So there have been interesting developments. This bit about the contract hookups reminds me of Qwest's former CEO Joseph Naccio.
Here is what Naccio filed while fighting charges -- unlike virtually every white collar weasel ever, he ultimately got convicted of insider trading, no doubt with only the finest SIGINT available. Redacted PDF :: http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/512.pdf
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_22918125/former-qwest-ceo-joe-nacchio-moved-halfway-house - April 2013 he is getting out of jail soon with enormous fines as well. Many posts at Denver Post.
Nacchio, who turns 64 in June, was convicted in 2007 on 19 counts of illegal insider trading connected to his sale of $52 million in Qwest stock. A federal jury in Denver found that he sold the shares based on nonpublic information about the company's deteriorating financial condition.
Lucrative secret contracts indeedly doodley.
The NSA, which needed Qwest's participation to completely cover the country, pushed back hard. ...
... the agency suggested that Qwest's foot-dragging might affect its ability to get future classified work with the government.
Nacchio Alleges Reprisal
Qwest Ex-CEO Says Firm Denied Pacts After Spurning NSA
Contentions from former telecommunications executive Joseph Nacchio that the government retaliated against his company because he didn't comply with National Security Agency requests could add to the renewed debate over the NSA's secret surveillance of telephone records.
Once-classified documents that were unveiled in the insider-trading case of Mr. Nacchio, the former chief of Qwest Communications International Inc., Q +1.60% suggest the U.S. government didn't offer lucrative contracts to the company after Mr. Nacchio refused to cooperate with what the documents call "improper government requests" in February 2001. The documents, submitted as part of Mr. Nacchio's defense in the insider-trading case, don't elaborate on the government requests. Mr. Nacchio has said in the past he didn't comply when asked by the NSA for access to the private phone records of Qwest customers.
Mr. Nacchio in April was convicted in federal court in Denver of insider trading for selling $52 million of stock in the spring of 2001 as Qwest's outlook was deteriorating. He was sentenced to six years in prison but remains free pending his appeal. His attorneys suggested in pretrial filings that Mr. Nacchio believed the company was about to win secret government contracts that would keep it in the black, despite warnings from his executive team that the company was in financial trouble. The judge at his trial didn't allow much of the classified defense, and Mr. Nacchio's appeal disputes that decision. The latest revelations were in pretrial briefs filed months ago that were unsealed last week.
A spokesman for the Director of National Intelligence office, which oversees the NSA and other intelligence agencies, declined to comment on the allegations in the court filings.
The revelations emerge as the White House is in negotiations with Congress on long-term changes to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Democrats, and some Republicans, in Congress are at odds with the Bush administration's demand that lawmakers preserve the secrecy of the NSA program by granting telecommunications companies immunity from lawsuits for any aid they gave to the government surveillance without a court order.
The administration has balked at giving Congress documents detailing the legal justifications for the NSA program, and says that the secrecy is necessary to protect national security.
Speaking on Fox News channel yesterday, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D., Md.) restated his position that Democrats were willing to pass such immunity, if the administration turned over documents about the NSA program.
The Daily Caller is trying to get this narrative bounced again: http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/13/jailed-qwest-ceo-claimed-that-nsa-retaliated-because-he-wouldnt-participate-in-spy-program/
CBS news in 2009: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-1616326.html
Naccio's argument was not allowed in open court. Of course that Denver judge also had the NSA all over his phone too I would hazard to guess.
But who cares what the NSA does to judge's phones anyway? (see NSA whistleblower Russ Tice specifying NSA space asset surveillance vs Justice Alito for example)
Don't forget Israel re NSA contractors: read up on James Bamford on Israeli contractors & the NSA: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/04/shady-companies-nsa/ . A few salient snippets on the pervasive role of the spinoff companies of Israel's NSA equivalent, Unit 8200:
Like Narus, Verint was founded by in Israel by Israelis, including Jacob “Kobi” Alexander, a former Israeli intelligence officer. Some 800 employees work for Verint, including 350 who are based in Israel, primarily working in research and development and operations, according to the Jerusalem Post. Among its products is STAR-GATE, which according to the company’s sales literature, lets “service providers … access communications on virtually any type of network, retain communication data for as long as required, and query and deliver content and data …” and was “[d]esigned to manage vast numbers of targets, concurrent sessions, call data records, and communications.”
In a rare and candid admission to Forbes, Retired Brig. Gen. Hanan Gefen, a former commander of the highly secret Unit 8200, Israel’s NSA, noted his former organization’s influence on Comverse, which owns Verint, as well as other Israeli companies that dominate the U.S. eavesdropping and surveillance market. “Take NICE, Comverse and Check Point for example, three of the largest high-tech companies, which were all directly influenced by 8200 technology,” said Gefen. “Check Point was founded by Unit alumni. Comverse’s main product, the Logger, is based on the Unit’s technology.”
According to a former chief of Unit 8200, both the veterans of the group and much of the high-tech intelligence equipment they developed are now employed in high-tech firms around the world. “Cautious estimates indicate that in the past few years,” he told a reporter for the Israeli newspaper Ha’artez in 2000, “Unit 8200 veterans have set up some 30 to 40 high-tech companies, including 5 to 10 that were floated on Wall Street.” Referred to only as “Brigadier General B,” he added, “This correlation between serving in the intelligence Unit 8200 and starting successful high-tech companies is not coincidental: Many of the technologies in use around the world and developed in Israel were originally military technologies and were developed and improved by Unit veterans.”
Equally troubling is the issue of corruption. Kobi Alexander, the founder and former chairman of Verint, is now a fugitive, wanted by the FBI on nearly three dozen charges of fraud, theft, lying, bribery, money laundering and other crimes. And two of his top associates at Comverse, Chief Financial Officer David Kreinberg and former General Counsel William F. Sorin, were also indicted in the scheme and later pleaded guilty, with both serving time in prison and paying millions of dollars in fines and penalties.
Anyway that's enough stuff for now. Figure better to get a hard reference of it for those interested!