Exclusive: National Security Agency to spy on Boston for 2024 Olympics in National Special Security Event SIGINT Spectacular, Snowden leak shows


Most people have no idea that the National Security Agency gets involved in big events like national political conventions and the Olympics: National Special Security Events (NSSEs) with security led by the Secret Service, which is now a part of the Department of Homeland Security.

This was apparently overlooked until now: the National Security Agency lists one of its top level "strategic missions" as getting involved with NSSEs such as the Olympics, according to a file published by the NY Times in Nov 2013 and attributed to Edward Snowden. See also: Olympics in Boston would require an unprecedented security effort - Boston Globe (Jan 15)

Many ideas taken for granted - including the separation of military and civilian life within the US - evaporate in NSSEs. Many, many federal agencies send little teams, including advanced military intelligence.

Header_Logo.pngI had only recently rejoiced that the 2016 Democratic National Convention wouldn't land in Minneapolis. The new crowd running Minneapolis actually saw the light there. These giant spectacles are a huge diversion of focus, don't help cities achieve their goals, at a vastly inflated expense, while compromising the rights of city residents. Many opponents are acting including No Boston Olympics and NoBoston2024 | Independent voices of Boston area residents opposed to the Boston 2024 Olympic bid.

This is apparently the first time that it has been really noted the NSA's director in 2007 officially stated that NSSE's are strategic missions. This in turn means that the NSA must have had *some* role at the 2008 Republican National Convention in Minneapolis. (see our RNC documentary Terrorizing Dissent here & RNC08Report for docs) More background below the doc fulltext.

It's hard to overstate the nasty, elitist, disruptive effects of the Olympics. As a new resident of Boston, the unfortunate news that the 2024 Olympics now has this city in its crosshairs is disappointing & fear inducing. After all I ran into (at least) four FBI informants because of the 2008 RNC, gassed & shot at by the authorities.


2008 RNC memories - Photo Creative commons by Nigel Parry @flyingmonkeyair - src

I am publishing almost the whole document here except for the short page 2, as it is annoyingly difficult to locate online anyway. There are a lot of typos in the Optical Character Recognition, oh well.. See a little earlier coverage: Top Level Telecommunications: NSA's Strategic Mission List and Report: S. Korea key intelligence target for US eavesdropping - Zoom in Korea | Zoom in Korea (Nov 2013).

SOURCE: https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/15/20131104-nyt-sigint_goals.pdf


United States SIGINT System January 2007 Strategic Mission List

Introduction - Director’s Intent

(S//SI) The SIGINT Strategic Mission List represents the intent of the Director, National Security Agency in regard to mission priorities and risks for the United States S1G1NT System (USSS) over the next 12-18 months The list is derived from review of the Intelligence Community National Intelligence Priorities Framework, DC1/DNI Guidance, the Strategic Warning List, National SIGINT Requirements Process (NSRP) and other strategic planning documents The missions included on the list are in relative priority order and represent the most urgent tasks for the USSS The list is not intended to be all encompassing, but is intended to set forth guidance on the highest priorities.

Topical Missions and Enduring Targets

(S//S1) The SIGINT Strategic Mission List is divided into two parts. It includes 16 critical topical missions in Part I of the list, which represent missions discerned to be areas of highest priority for the USSS, where SIGINT can make key contributions. In addition to the 16 critical topical missions, Part U of the SIGINT Strategic Mission List includes 6 enduring targets that are included due to the need to work these targets holistically because o f their strategic importance. In addition to their long-term strategic importance, the enduring targets can potentially "trump" the highest priority topical missions on the list at any time, based upon evolving world events. Elements o f these targets are also represented throughout the topical target sets. For each of the 16 topical missions and each of the 6 enduring targets the Strategic Mission List includes:

1) Focus Areas - critically important targets against which the SIGINT enterprise is placing emphasis. DIRNSA designation of a target as a focus area constitutes his guidance to the SIGINT System that it is a "must do” target for that mission
2) Accepted Risks strategically significant targets against which the USSS is not placing emphasis and for which SIGINT should not be relied upon as a primary source. DIRNSA's reasons for accepting these risks include high difficulty and lack of resources or as an “Economy of Force Measure,” in order to achieve focus on the most critical targets

A Strategic Investment Tool for SIGINT Resources

(S//S1) Given a finite level of resources available in all mission areas, the Strategic Mission List provides high-level strategic direction to the global SIGINT system to focus resources on the most important/highest priority areas. “Risks” identify targets that cannot be resourced to the level of a Focus Area, thereby acknowledging that shortfalls will exist. As world circumstances change, these or other targets can be added to the list as needed, targets no longer of critical importance can also be removed from the Focus Area category. In addition, other targets, not listed as focus or risk areas, can also be wrorked by the USSS to a lesser degree to meet other customer requirements. The Strategic Mission List will be reviewed bi- annually by the USSS Signals Intelligence leadership Team Missions. Focus areas, and Accepted Risks will be adjusted as a means of providing high-level steerage to the Nation’s agile SIGINT System.


United States SIGINT System Strategic Mission L ist- January 2007

(U) I. Strategic Mission List - Topical Missions

(S//S1) A. MISSION: Terrorism: Winning the Global War on Terrorism. Focus Areas:

a. All Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (I1CT) Tier 0 and 1 terrorist groups with capabilities and intentions to attack the US, its interests or allies, or groups actively planning or carrying out a terrorist attack against U.S. persons, facilities, or interests

b. Key individuals and Terrorist Support Entities (TSE) involved in the facilitation, financing, and recruitmentorradicalizationofallIICT Tier0and 1terroristgroupnetworksglobally.

Accepted Risks: All IICT Tier 2,3, and 4 terrorist groups, and TSEs.

(S//S1) B. MISSION: Homeland Security: Protecting the U.S. Homeland from terrorist attack and other transnational threats to safeguard U.S. persons, freedoms, critical information, infrastructure, property and economy.
Focus Areas:

a Border Security (land, air, sea).
b. Direct defense against terrorist attack.
c. Diseases, epidemics, and pandemics.
d. Executive Protection/U.S.-Based NSSEs
e. Illicit Facilitation as it relates to special interest aliens and CBRN materials and technology

Accepted Risks:

a Accepted risks as stated in the “Terrorism” mission.
b. Global coverage o f all illicit activities of potential concern to the Homeland.

(S//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) C. MISSION: W M P and CBRN Programs and Proliferation: Combating the Threat of Development and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, CBRN, and Delivery Methods (particularly ballistic and nuclear-capable cruise missiles).
Focus Areas:

a. Development, Acquisition, or Use of CBRN.
b.State W'MD and ballistic and cruise missile programs of:

China (biological, chemical, nuclear, ballistic and cruise missiles) India (nuclear, ballistic missiles)
Iran (biological, chemical, nuclear, and ballistic missiles)
North Korea (biological, chemical, nuclear, ballistic missiles) Pakistan (nuclear, ballistic missiles)

Russia (biological, chemical, nuclear, ballistic and cruise missiles)

Syria (chemical, nuclear, ballistic missiles).
c.W MD and missile proliferation activities by states:

China (nuclear, ballistic missiles), Israel (cruise missiles) North Korea (nuclear, ballistic missiles)

Pakistan (nuclear, ballistic missiles)

Russia (ballistic missile).
d.W.MD and missile acquisition activities by states:

China (cruise missiles)
India (cruise missiles)
Iran (nuclear, ballistic missiles)
Pakistan (cruise missiles)
Saudi Arabia (nuclear, ballistic missiles).

e.Safety and Security ofWMD: Pakistan (nuclear)
Russia (nuclear).

Accepted Risks:
State WMD and ballistic and cruise missile programs of: Egypt (ballistic missiles)
Libya (ballistic missiles)
Taiwan (ballistic missiles).

(S//S1) D. MISSION: U.S. Forces at Risk (Military Support): Protecting U.S. Military Forces Deployed Overseas and Enabling their Operations.
Focus Areas:

a. U.S. forces deployed in: Iraq. Afghanistan. Mideast Region. Korea, and Philippines.
b. Support to military planning and operations: Support to OPLAN 5027 (Korea).
c. Intentions of foreign and indigenous anti-coalition forces, command and control. OOB, and

operational support in Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. Support to U.S. forces in identification of HVTs in Afghanistan/ Pakistan and Iraq

Accepted Risks:

a Protection of U S forces deployed in: Balkans (Kosovo),
b South Korea leadership intentions in OPLAN 5027.
c Routine military support to U.S. forces deployed in non-combat situations.

(S//S1) E. MISSION: State/Political Stability: Providing Warning of Impending State Instability. Focus Areas:

a. Internal political activities that could threaten the survivability of leadership in countries where US has interest in regime continuity Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

b. Internal political activities that could result in crisis in. North Korea, Sudan/Dafur humanitarian crisis. Cuba, Kosovo, Turkey, Nigeria, Lebanon, Venezuela, Syria, Bolivia, Latin American Bolivarian Developments, and Palestinian Authority.

Accepted Risks: Internal political stability of: Egypt, Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, DROC, Bangladesh, Georgia, Jordan, and Haiti.

(S//SI) F. MISSION: Warning of Strategic Nuclear Missile Threats: Providing Warning of a Strategic Nuclear Missile Attack on the territory of the 50 United States.
Focus Areas: Areas covered under a peacetime SIGINT strategy maintaining full capabilities with reasonably sufficient coverage for the provision of warning include: Russia's Nuclear C3, Mobile

ICBMs, strategic navy missiles, and Bombers; China's Nuclear C3, Mobile ICBMs, and SSBNs; and North Korea's Nuclear C3 and potential ICBM (TD-2) Threat.
Accepted Risks: Strategic Targets where SIGINT is not a primary intelligence source in providing warning: Russia's Silo-based ICBMs; China's Silo-based ICBMs.

(S//SI) G. MISSION: Regional Conflict and Crisis/Flashpoints to War: Monitoring Regional Tensions that Could Escalate to Conflict/Crisis.
Focus Areas:
Regional flashpoints that could pose a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests: Arab,Iran-Israel conflict, Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, Venezuela (impact on surrounding region), and Russia/Georgia.

Accepted Risks: Regional flashpoints in: Ethiopia-Eritrea and Africa Great Lakes Region

(S//REL USA. AUS. CAN, GBR. NZL) H. MISSION: Information Operations: Mastering Cyberspace and Preventing an Attack on U.S. Critical Information Systems.
Focus Areas:

a (S//SI) Enabling Computer Network Defense (CND): Provide cyber threat warning, detection, characterization, and mitigation services for U.S. and allied computer network operators: Named Intrusion Sets (Including, but not limited to Gadget Hiss. Seed Sphere/Byzantine Trace. Makers Mark. Byzantine Candor), New intrusions.

b. (S//REL USA, AUS, CAN. GBR, NZL) Enabling Computer Network Attack (CNA): Deliver intelligence, access, and dual-use capabilities in support of U.S. computer network attack objectives. c. (S//SI) Foreign Intelligence Serv ices' Cyber Threat Activities: Deliver intelligence on the capabilities.

vulnerabilities, plans and intentions o f foreign actors to conduct CNO against USG networks and those of interest to the USG. Identify what Foreign Intel Services know about USG capabilities, vulnerabilities, plans and intentions to conduct CNO: China, Russia, Iran, and al-Qa'ida

d (S//SI) Enabling Electronic Warfare (EW): Provide cognizance ofthe EM environment, signal detection/geolocation, and characterization through intelligence (ELINT. COMINT, Tech SIGINT) and other technical means to U.S. EW planners and operators: China. Russia, Iran, Iraq/Afghanistan (IED's) and North Korea.

e. (S//SI) Enabling Influence Operations: Support U.S. military deception (MILDEC) and psychological operations (PSYOP), and inter-agency Strategic Communication objectives to influence target behavior and activities: Terrorist groups. China. North Korea. Iran, and Venezuela.

Accepted Risks:

a. Enabling CND: Isolated malicious activity that could pose a serious threat.
b. Enabling CNA.
c. FIS Cyber Threat: France, Israel, Cuba, India, and North Korea.
d. Enabling EW: (producers.'’prolifcrators): Sweden, Japan. Germany, Israel, and France, e Enabling Influence Operations: Pakistan and Russia.

(S//SI) I. MISSION: Military Modernization: Providing Early Detection ofCritical Developments in Foreign Military Programs.
Focus Areas:

b. Activities of state and non-state actors (gray arms dealers) in supplying advanced conventional weapons.

c. Threats posed by foreign space and counter-space systems: China and Russia Accepted Risks:

a Weapons and force developments in: Saudi Arabia, and India
b Threats posed by foreign space and counter-space systems India and France

(S//SI) J. MISSION: Emerging Strategic Technologies: Preventing Technological Surprise.
Focus Areas:
Critical technologies that could provide a strategic military, economic, or political advantage: high energy lasers, low energy lasers, advances in computing and information technology, directed energy weapons, stealth and counter-stealth, electronic warfare technologies, space and remote sensing, electro-optics, nanotechnologies, energetic materials The emerging strategic technology threat is expected to come mainly from Russia. China. India, Japan. Germany, France. Korea. Israel, Singapore, and Sweden.

Accepted Risks: Technological advances and/or basic S&T development on a global basis elsewhere.

(S//S1) K. MISSION: Foreign Policy ((includes Intention of Nations and Multinational Orgs)): Ensuring Diplomatic Advantage for the US.
Focus Areas:
Positions, objectives, programs, and actions on the part of governments or multilateral organizations that could significantly impact U.S. national security interests: China, Russia, France, Germany, Japan. Iran. Israel. Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Afghanistan. Iraq. UN, Venezuela, Syria. Turkey, Mexico, South Korea, India and Pakistan.

Accepted Risks: Positions, objectives, programs, and actions on the part of governments or multilateral organizations that could impact U.S. foreign policy or security interests: Taiwran.

(S//SI) l~ MISSION: Energy Security: Ensuring a Steady and Reliable Energy Supply for the US. Focus Areas: Threats to the production and global distribution/transportation of energy supplies of: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, V enezuela, Iran, Russia and Nigeria. Accepted Risks: Global impact o f the state o f energy industries in: Mexico and China.

(S//SI) M. MISSION: Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence; Denial & Deception Activities: Countering Foreign Intelligence Threats.
Focus Areas:
Espionage/intelligence collection operations and manipulation/influence operations conducted by foreign intelligence services directed against U.S. government, military', science & technology and Intelligence Community from: China, Russia, Cuba, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea. France. Venezuela, and South Korea

Accepted Risks: Espionage'intelligence collection operations against U.S. government, military, science & technology and Intelligence Community from: Taiwan and Saudi Arabia

(S//S1) N. MISSION: Narcotics and Transnational Criminal Syndicates and Networks: Mitigating the impact on U.S. national interests from drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and transnational criminal syndicates and networks (TCSNs).
Focus Areas:

a. DTOs and associated enabling activities in Afghanistan, Mexico and Colombia that threaten U.S.interests.

b.TCSNs based in (or originating in) Russia that threaten U.S. or allied interests.

c. Money laundering that benefits TCSNs within, into, and out of Colombia and Mexico.

d. Criminal facilitators acting as a nexus between crime/narcotics and terrorism.

e. State-sponsored money laundering by Iran and North Korea. Accepted Risks:

a Drug production/trafficking within the Golden Triangle, China, and North Korea b. TCSNs operating in Central Asia, former Eastern Europe, and Asia,
c Criminal associated money laundering in Afghanistan, and Iraq.

State-sponsored money laundering by Syria.

(S//S1) O. MISSION: Economic Stability/Influence: Ensuring U.S. Economic Advantage and Policy Strategies.
Focus Areas:
Economic stability, financial vulnerability, and economic influence of states of strategic interest to the US: China, Japan, Iraq, and Brazil.

Accepted Risks: Economic stability, financial vulnerability, and economic influence of states of strategic interest to the US: Turkey and India.

(S//S1) P. Mission: Global Signals Cognizance: The core communications infrastructure and global network information needed to achieve and maintain baseline knowledge. Capture knowledge of location, characterization, use, and status of military and civil communications infrastructure, including command, control, communications and computer networks: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting systems; and associated structures incidental to pursuing Strategic Mission List priorities. Focus of mission is creating knowledge databases that enable SIGINT efforts against future unanticipated threats and allow continuity on economy of force targets not currently included on the Strategic Mission List. Focus Areas:

Global Environment knowledge Signals knowledge.

Network knowledge.

Target knowledge.
Accepted Risks: Degree of maturity may greatly vary by target

(U) II. Strategic Mission List - Enduring Targets

(S//S1) A. MISSION: China: Enabling U.S. policy and avoiding strategic surprise. Focus Areas: Provide U.S. decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective oftrends and developments in China, assessing and/or predicting strategic direction, plans, intentions, and capabilities that impact U.S. interests. Such analysis must consider China’s strategic foreign and economic policy trends that impact U S. interests or degrade U.S. influence, the pace, scope, doctrine, and economic sustainability of China’s military modernization, the proliferation of PRC weapons and technology; the prospects for regional conflict or strategic nuclear attack; domestic economic transformation and its consequences for economic, political, and social stability'; subversive threats to U.S. institutions through hostile intelligence and information operations, and the interdependencies among these developments Accepted Risks: Certain domestic problem sets, such as demographic issues; lower-level political institutional growth; civil society' issues such as crime and human rights; environmental problems and planning; and agricultural production and food security'. Also, issues that transcend national boundaries, such as Chinese involvement in international organized crime; energy demand, production, and acquisition; and infectious disease and health.

(S//S1) B. MISSION: North Korea: Enabling the US to counteract North Korea’s development/use/proliferation of WMD, deter its aggression, and shape its behavior while maintaining U.S. readiness for collapse/war. Focus Areas: Provide U.S. decision-makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of trends and developments in North Korea, assessing and/or predicting strategic direction, plans, intentions, and capabilities that impact U S interests and provide warning o f strategic threat. Such analysis must consider the stability of the North Korean regime and how it employs domestic and foreign policies to maintain its grip on power; the relationship between regime stability/behavior and its access to income from illicit activities and weapons proliferation; how Chinese and South Korean “carrots and sticks” enable or constrain North Korean behavior; the impact of the decaying North Korean economy on military' readiness; and how the interplay between U S policy initiatives toward North Korea and all of the above elements affect North Korea’s strategic calculus, the material disposition of its nuclear weapons, and the status of its military Accepted Risks: For domestic issues, risks include non-defense oriented industrial production, demographic issues, and environmental problems. Regarding issues that transcend borders, risks include non-counterintelligence associated ties between North Korean state- sponsored illicit activities and international organized crime institutions and individuals; North Korean agent activity in South Korea and Japan; non-state sponsored corruption and illicit behavior; and North Korean economic refugee flows into China

(S//S1) C. MISSION: Iraq: Enabling Coalition efforts to assist Iraq in establishing a secure, unified, democratic, and sovereign state. Focus Areas: Provide U S decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of trends and developments, assessing Iraq’s progress toward establishing a viable, stable government; securing public order, suppressing insurgent opposition, ensuring reliable access to basic services and commodities; safeguarding strategic resources; and restoring a more sound economic footing. Provide intelligence on relevant factors, forces, leaders, and regional actors to facilitate U.S. Governmentpolicy or actions in support of the Iraqi process and to seize the strategic communications initiative.

Accepted Risks: none

(S//S1) D. MISSION: Iran: Enabling policymakers in preventing Iran from achieving its regional dominance objectives and pursuing policies that impact U.S. global interests. Focus Areas: Provide U.S. decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of regional trends and developments, assessing and/or predicting strategic direction, plans, intentions and capabilities that impact U.S. interests. Assess Iran's foreign policy trends and leadership intentions that impact U.S. interests or degrade U.S. influence. Provide warning of Iran's capability to produce a nuclear weapon or its plans to use terrorist surrogates to attack Israel or U.S. forces and interests Assess the regime's progress in initiatives that enhance its pursuit of regional power objectives in the political, economic, energy, and religious or ideological arenas

Provide indicators of regime stability and/or susceptibility to democratic reform initiatives Accepted Risks: Efforts to ascertain the scope of Iran's narcotics'organized crime elements and economic stability/influence.

(S//S1) E. MISSION: Russia: Assuring diplomatic and strategic advantage and avoiding critical surprise. Focus Areas: Provide U.S. policy and decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of developments and trends in Russia, assessing and/or predicting strategic direction, plans, intentions, and capabilities that impact U S. interests Such analysis must consider Russia's strategic foreign policy and economic intentions and actions as they pertain to U S interests and influence in the region and globally; the strength of Russia's economy and its impact on Russian power projection capability and strategic positioning; Russia's efforts to regain military strength and stimulate economic growth through the development and sale ofadvanced technology and weaponry', and the role ofWMD, organized crime and counterintelligence in enabling Russian strategic initiatives. Accepted Risks: Certain domestic issues such as demographics, regional politics, development of civil society in the country, and monitoring of low-level military' training activities. Also, issues that transcend national boundaries such as Russia’s plans, intentions and capabilities regarding influence on the former Soviet space

(S//S1) F. MISSION: Venezuela: Enabling policymakers in preventing Venezuela from achieving its regional leadership objectives and pursuing policies that negatively impact U.S. global interests. Focus Areas: Provide U.S. decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of regional trends and developments, assessing and/or predicting strategic direction, plans, intentions and capabilities that impact U S interests Assess Venezuela's foreign policy trends and leadership intentions that impact U S

interests or degrade U S. influence Assess Chavez’ progress in his initiatives to pursue regional power objectives in the political, economic, energy, and ideological arenas. Provide indicators of regime stability, particularly in the energy sector. Assess the depth and breadth of Venezuela's relations with countries of strategic concern to the United States, particularly Iran, Cuba, China, and Russia. Accepted R i s k s : E f f o r t s t o a s c e r t a i n t h e s c o p e o f V e n e z u e l a ’s n a r c o t i c s / o r g a n i z e d c r i m e e l e m e n t s a n d e c o n o m i c stability/influence.

Nice to have a record of all this so it's easier to find later. I might write some more stories about lesser known NSSE features that apply to this impending nightmare if I can find the time. For now...


Quick notes: Lesser-known agencies such as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and US Northern Command also get very busy in the domestic battlespace indeed. NSSEs are part of their annual activity cycle of exercises and practice operations.

See previously: Nov 2010: USNORTHCOM: Secret 'Trigger' & blueprint for emergency domestic military crackdown plan revealed | HongPong.com - CONPLAN3502 is another story altogether - but it makes you wonder what the NSA connection to NORTHCOM's 'civil disturbance operations' would be.

Feb 2009: Targeting the RNC Welcoming Committee: A Case Study in Political Paranoia | Dissident Voice

Having declared the RNC a National Security Special Event (NSSE), one that derived its “authorization” to target activists and journalists from the top secret 2006 National Security Presidential Directive-46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-15 (NSPD-46/HSPD-15), local, state and federal law enforcement entities, the U.S. military, intelligence agencies such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and corporate partners in the telecommunications industry and elsewhere, preemptively disrupted legal political dissent by a score of protest groups.

Revealing RNC document leaked: RNC '08 Report: Text: Revealing RNC document leaked (ACLU Nov 21 2008)

RNC '08 Report: Police & Security Documents: Powerpoint presentation: National Special Security Events (NSSE) - background involving March 2008.

Digging around - the NGA pulled its old Pathfinder issues. You'll have to look in Archive.org - January/February Pathfinder 2009

Boston skyline source Creative Commons: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/Boston_Skyline_Panorama_Dusk_Edit_1.jpg

Upper right logo by Dan McCall - libertyManiacs.com - http://cdn0.dailydot.com/uploaded/images/original/2013/8/27/NSA-Listens-Shirtmock.jpg

Cyberpunk art: http://boingboing.net/2015/05/08/your-cyberpunk-games-are-dange.html


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