Pentagon

"10 providers serve 80 percent of the market. We have classified relationships with a good number of them." -- US Rep Mike Rogers, reminding us how the government creates cartel structures [source Reuters]

One of the more interesting news elements concerns how the federal goverment is going to hand out teh very tastiest candy to contractors - specifically SAIC it now appears - in the form of classified undisclosed hacker attack goodies.

Interestingly AT&T would get get very very important info about vulnerabilities on Apple and other major corporate rivals, providing them with a colossal competitive edge in the so-called "marketplace".

Basically you have the introduction of a cartel system for hacking, reminiscent perhaps of the cartel system for distributing drugs so profitably for the powers-that-be. And of course Homeland Security in the middle, the keystone.

The government/contractor class is entering a more demented, less sound phase of the information age by hoarding important software bugs instead of getting them fixed.

Foreign spooks will surely get their hands on tons of hacks and way more systems will end up getting seriously assaulted. Putting up large cash bounties for responsible disclosure (i.e. telling people who can issue security patches to the public, then telling the public) is almost certainly a better way to approach the problem.

This current policy direction will probably cause far more havoc on the Internet than it will prevent, shocking an outcome as that may be.

Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity | The White House

[...] Sec. 2. Critical Infrastructure. As used in this order, the term critical infrastructure means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.[......]

Sec. 4. Cybersecurity Information Sharing. (a) It is the policy of the United States Government to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with U.S. private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and defend themselves against cyber threats. Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security (the "Secretary"), and the Director of National Intelligence shall each issue instructions consistent with their authorities and with the requirements of section 12(c) of this order to ensure the timely production of unclassified reports of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland that identify a specific targeted entity. The instructions shall address the need to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations.

(b) The Secretary and the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a process that rapidly disseminates the reports produced pursuant to section 4(a) of this order to the targeted entity. Such process shall also, consistent with the need to protect national security information, include the dissemination of classified reports to critical infrastructure entities authorized to receive them. The Secretary and the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a system for tracking the production, dissemination, and disposition of these reports.

(c) To assist the owners and operators of critical infrastructure in protecting their systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, or harm, the Secretary, consistent with 6 U.S.C. 143 and in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, shall, within 120 days of the date of this order, establish procedures to expand the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program to all critical infrastructure sectors. This voluntary information sharing program will provide classified cyber threat and technical information from the Government to eligible critical infrastructure companies or commercial service providers that offer security services to critical infrastructure.

(d) The Secretary, as the Executive Agent for the Classified National Security Information Program created under Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010 (Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities), shall expedite the processing of security clearances to appropriate personnel employed by critical infrastructure owners and operators, prioritizing the critical infrastructure identified in section 9 of this order.

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So "critical infrastructure" includes plenty of big corporate interests and anything that would affect their economic well-being is a threat. As always, regulations which make institutions more permanent, as opposition to the "critical" elements of society becomes blended with "terrorism".

U.S. gives big, secret push to Internet surveillance | Politics and Law - CNET News - April 24, Declan McCullaugh (who probably doesn't talk to sources on the f&!!ing telephone that much these days)

Senior Obama administration officials have secretly authorized the interception of communications carried on portions of networks operated by AT&T and other Internet service providers, a practice that might otherwise be illegal under federal wiretapping laws.

The secret legal authorization from the Justice Department originally applied to a cybersecurity pilot project in which the military monitored defense contractors' Internet links. Since then, however, the program has been expanded by President Obama to cover all critical infrastructure sectors including energy, healthcare, and finance starting June 12.

Those documents show the National Security Agency and the Defense Department were deeply involved in pressing for the secret legal authorization, with NSA director Keith Alexander participating in some of the discussions personally. Despite initial reservations, including from industry participants, Justice Department attorneys eventually signed off on the project.

The Justice Department agreed to grant legal immunity to the participating network providers in the form of what participants in the confidential discussions refer to as "2511 letters," a reference to the Wiretap Act codified at 18 USC 2511 in the federal statute books.

The Wiretap Act limits the ability of Internet providers to eavesdrop on network traffic except when monitoring is a "necessary incident" to providing the service or it takes place with a user's "lawful consent." An industry representative told CNET the 2511 letters provided legal immunity to the providers by agreeing not to prosecute for criminal violations of the Wiretap Act. It's not clear how many 2511 letters were issued by the Justice Department.

In 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn publicly disclosed the existence of the original project, called the DIB Cyber Pilot, which used login banners to inform network users that monitoring was taking place. In May 2012, the pilot was turned into an ongoing program -- broader but still voluntary -- by the name of Joint Cybersecurity Services Pilot, with the Department of Homeland Security becoming involved for the first time. It was renamed again to Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program in January, and is currently being expanded to all types of companies operating critical infrastructure.

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So you have a pilot program that covered the "Defense Industrial Base" or DIB. The security measures used to keep tabs on contractor computers are now rolled out across the interwebs. More on DIB below.

But military-style wiretapping America with fancy 2511 loopholes isn't enough! Let's hand out hacks too! Not surprisingly the NSA's main digital plumbing people, specifically SAIC, are jumping aboard the classified Goodie Gravy train.

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SAIC, Inc. : SAIC Signs Agreement With Department of Homeland Security To Be A Commercial Service Provider

05/15/2013| 04:10pm US/Eastern

MCLEAN, Va., May 15, 2013 /PRNewswire/ -- Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (NYSE: SAI) signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program to become a Commercial Service Provider (CSP) of approved ECS services that will strengthen protection of U.S. critical infrastructure against imminent cyber attacks. In accordance with the MOA, SAIC is developing the capability and security certifications to utilize threat indicators for securing critical infrastructure customers against cyber threats.

Securing the Future is a guiding mission for SAIC. For decades, SAIC professionals have served the U.S. government and corporate America with expertise and technology to better protect our citizens, our military and our networks. SAIC is currently collaborating with community leaders and building key technologies and architectures that enable trusted sharing of threat information in real-time to protect against both the known and unknown threat landscape.

ECS is a voluntary information sharing program that assists critical infrastructure owners and operators as they improve the protection of their systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, or data exfiltration. DHS works with cybersecurity organizations from across the federal government to gain access to a broad range of sensitive and classified cyber threat information. DHS develops indicators based on this information and shares them with qualified CSPs, thus enabling them to better protect their customers who are critical infrastructure entities.

Key Quotes:

John Thomas, National Security Sector Acting President
"We must work together to protect our infrastructure, our economy, and our security from cyber attacks. If we don't work together, we won't succeed. This is why SAIC is proud to be a part of this endeavor to share valuable threat information between government and critical infrastructure providers."

Julie Taylor, Cybersecurity Operation Manager for National Security Services
"This collaboration between SAIC and DHS puts in place a new approach to threat sharing across public and private sectors that offers a positive shift in the threat landscape. Each step we take to cultivate our cyber ecosystem with trusted information sharing relationships will have a direct return on stabilizing our national security and our economy. Now that the doors of communication are open, we can further the cyber mission with valuable action as a team. "

David Lacquement, Cybersecurity Program Director
"As a former government executive in cyber threat management, I have seen firsthand the immense value that threat information sharing at network speed can offer to sustaining trusted channels for online transactions and communications. This public-private collaboration is strategically vital to significantly raising the level of cyber awareness, vigilance, and protection across our nation's critical infrastructure."

About SAIC
SAIC is a FORTUNE 500(®) scientific, engineering, and technology applications company that uses its deep domain knowledge to solve problems of vital importance to the nation and the world, in national security, energy and the environment, critical infrastructure, and health. The Company's approximately 40,000 employees serve customers in the U.S. Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government civil agencies and selected commercial markets. Headquartered in McLean, Va., SAIC had annual revenues of approximately $11.2 billion for its fiscal year ended January 31, 2013. For more information, visit www.SAIC.com. SAIC: From Science to Solutions®

Statements in this announcement, other than historical data and information, constitute forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. A number of factors could cause our actual results, performance, achievements, or industry results to be very different from the results, performance, or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Some of these factors include, but are not limited to, the risk factors set forth in SAIC's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended January 31, 2013, and other such filings that SAIC makes with the SEC from time to time. Due to such uncertainties and risks, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof.

Contact: Melissa Koskovich Jennifer Gephart

(703) 676-6762 (703) 676-6389

Melissa.l.koskovich@saic.com Jennifer.a.gephart@saic.com

SOURCE SAIC

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Here is the Department of Homeland Security page on it: Enhanced Cybersecurity Services | Homeland Security. See also Office of Cybersecurity and Communications and Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience. I wonder if someone gets applause for these titles, whew...

Enhanced Cybersecurity Services

Protecting critical infrastructure against growing and evolving cyber threats requires a layered approach. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) actively collaborates with public and private sector partners every day to respond to and coordinate mitigation efforts against attempted disruptions and adverse impacts to the nation’s critical cyber and communications networks and infrastructure.

As the federal government’s lead agency for coordinating the protection, prevention, mitigation, and recovery from cyber incidents, DHS works regularly with business owners and operators to strengthen their facilities and communities. To accomplish this, the DHS Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program was expanded in February 2013 by Executive Order - Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.

ECS is a voluntary information sharing program that assists critical infrastructure owners and operators as they improve the protection of their systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, or data exfiltration. DHS works with cybersecurity organizations from across the federal government to gain access to a broad range of sensitive and classified cyber threat information. DHS develops indicators based on this information and shares them with qualified Commercial Service Providers (CSPs), thus enabling them to better protect their customers who are critical infrastructure entities. ECS augments, but does not replace, an entities’ existing cybersecurity capabilities.

The ECS program does not involve government monitoring of private networks or communications. Under the ECS program, information relating to threats and malware activities detected by the CSPs is not directly shared between the critical infrastructure CSP customers and the government. However, when a CSP customer voluntarily agrees, the CSP may share limited and anonymized information with ECS. See the Privacy Impact Assessment below for more details.

Critical Infrastructure Entities

Most critical infrastructure entities already utilize cybersecurity providers to protect their networks. The ECS program offers an enhanced approach to protecting these entities by supplementing existing services and commercial capabilities with U.S. Government cyber threat information. This approach supports the delivery of enhanced capabilities to eligible participants from all sectors.

Participation in the program is voluntary and is designed to protect government intelligence, corporate information security, and the privacy of participants, while enhancing the security of critical infrastructure. Validated entities from all critical infrastructure sectors are eligible to participate in the ECS program and receive ECS services from qualified CSPs.

To learn more about becoming a validated critical infrastructure entity, please contact the ECS Program Management Office at ECS_Program@HQ.DHS.gov.

Commercial Service Providers

CSPs receive threat information from DHS and use it to offer specified services to their critical infrastructure customers in a secure environment in order to ensure the security of government furnished information.

CSPs deliver services to eligible customers through commercial relationships. The ECS program is not involved in establishing the commercial relationships between CSPs and validated critical infrastructure entities. As of February 2013, the following CSPs are approved to provide ECS services to critical infrastructure entities:

• AT&T (ecs-pmo@list.att.com)
• CenturyLink (ecs@centurylink.com)

DHS is working with several additional providers who seek to offer enhanced cybersecurity services to entities. To learn about becoming a CSP, please contactECS_Program@HQ.DHS.gov.

Sector Specific Agencies

Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and DHS form a critical partnership within the ECS program. The role of the SSA is to leverage existing relationships with critical infrastructure entities to expand and improve ECS. The SSA is also responsible for helping to characterize risks and threats unique to critical infrastructure entities in their respective sectors. This characterization will enable the federal government to deliver the most effective indicators relevant to ECS protected entities based upon the unique threat environment of their sector. SSAs also serve as a vital conduit to DHS for data leading to requirements that will drive the development of ECS program capabilities.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

DHS embeds and enforces privacy protections and transparency in all its activities and uses the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) to assess and mitigate any impact on an individual’s privacy.   DHS has conducted and published a Privacy Impact Assessment for the ECS program. DHS also ensures that ECS and all of its cybersecurity activities are structured in a way that ensures individual rights are protected.

Contact Information

For more information, contact ECS_Program@HQ.DHS.gov.

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Once you poke around on FedBizOpps.gov a little bit it's easier to see how they blow so much money in DC.

Fun FEMA Pork tangent: Here are some FEMA satellite phone sole source contract. On the one hand, it's good someone has a satellite phone in emergencies, but someone is profiting off this sale...

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=4a1af0e4e2942226816...

FEMA seeks to acquire on an other than full and open competition basis MSAT satellite terminals. These terminals are primarily utilized in Disaster Operations for mission critical communications within FEMA, as well as for communicating with strategic partners to support disasters. There is currently only one commercial satellite operator in North America offering two-way radio, push-to-talk (PTT) capability integrated with telephone. This feature makes it possible to communicate with another terminal in a specific talk group anywhere in CONUS. Authority is FAR 6.302-1 The anticipated period of performance is for one year. THIS NOTICE OF INTENT IS NOT A REQUEST FOR COMPETITIVE QUOTES. NO TELEPHONE INQUIRIES WILL BE ACCEPTED. A determination by the Government not to compete this acquisition based upon responses to this notice is solely within the discretion of the Government.

Contracting Office Address:

500 C Street SW

Patriots Plaza -- 5th Floor

Washington, District of Columbia 20472

United States

Primary Point of Contact.:

Christine Thomas

christine.thomas@associates.fema.dhs.gov

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Anyway here is the Reuters story central to this whole turn of narrative, a new system "Outside of the Military Industrial Complex" indeed.

REUTERS: Government to Share Cyber Security Information with Private Sector - By Joseph Menn | May 15, 2013

SOURCE http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/05/15/292065.htm

The U.S. government will use classified information about software vulnerabilities for the first time to protect companies outside of the military industrial complex, top officials told Reuters this week.

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano said that a system being developed to scan Internet traffic headed toward critical businesses would block attacks on software programs that the general population does not realize are possible.

“It is a way to share information about known vulnerabilities that may not be commonly available,” Napolitano said at the Reuters Cybersecurity Summit in Washington, D.C.

The information would come from “a variety of sources” including intelligence agencies, she said on Tuesday.

The National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies develop and acquire knowledge about software flaws in order to penetrate overseas networks. Until now, there has been no straightforward way for these agencies to share that classified data with U.S. companies outside the defense sector, even though those companies could become victims of cyber attacks.

The plan is to discreetly share the data through what the government calls Enhanced Cybersecurity Services. Under a February presidential order, those services will be offered by telecommunications and defense companies to utilities, banks and other critical infrastructure companies that choose to pay for them.

Napolitano’s Department of Homeland Security will take the information from the NSA and other sources, and relay it to service providers with security clearances. The service providers would then use these “attack signatures” – such as Internet routing data and content associated with known adversary groups – to screen out malicious traffic.

Napolitano’s comments were the first disclosure that the screening would also cover attacks on software using methods known to the government that have not been disclosed to the software manufacturers or buyers.

While U.S. intelligence agencies have at times warned software manufacturers, such as Microsoft Corp. and Google Inc., or Homeland Security officials of specific, declassified problems, the new system will be machine-to-machine and far more rapid.

It reflects the realization that many espionage attacks from overseas are aimed at the private sector and that future destructive attacks may arrive the same way. (Classified attack signatures have been used to protect defense manufacturers under a Pentagon program.)

House of Representatives Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers said he was glad about the plan to share more broadly information about vulnerabilities, while maintaining control of the process to avoid tipping off rival countries or criminals.

“This can’t happen if you post it on a website,” Rogers, a Republican and lead author of a cybersecurity information-sharing bill that has passed the House, told the Summit. “We have to find a forum in which we can share it, and 10 providers serve 80 percent of the market. We have classified relationships with a good number of them.”

Among those that have agreed to provide the classified security services are AT&T Inc. and Raytheon Co. Northrop Grumman Corp. said this week it had also joined the program.

The secret but widespread U.S. practice of buying up tools leveraging unknown or “zero-day” software flaws for spying or attacks was the subject of a Reuters Special Report last week, in which former White House cybersecurity advisors said more flaws should be disclosed for defensive reasons.

Michael Daniel, the White House cybersecurity policy coordinator, told the Summit the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program was still evolving and the type of information shared would change as threats do.

“We want to use the full capabilities that we have to protect as much of the critical infrastructure as we can with that program,” he said.

(Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Tiffany Wu and Leslie Gevirtz)

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Here is the earlier Zero Day story: Booming 'zero-day' trade has Washington cyber experts worried | Reuters

(Reuters) - The proliferation of hacking tools known as zero-day exploits is raising concerns at the highest levels in Washington, even as U.S. agencies and defense contractors have become the biggest buyers of such products.

White House cybersecurity policy coordinator Michael Daniel said the trend was "very worrisome to us."

Asked if U.S. government buying in the offensive market was adding to the problem, Daniel said more study was needed. "There is a lot more work to be done in that space to look at the economic questions...so we can do a better job on the cost-benefit analysis," he said.

Some security experts say the government's purchasing power could help instead of hurt. They argue the U.S. government should bring the market into the open by announcing it will pay top dollar for zero-days and then disclosing all vulnerabilities to the companies concerned and their customers.

"Given that people are now buying vulnerabilities, the U.S. should simply announce that it is cornering the market, that they will pay 10 times anyone else," said Dan Geer, chief information security officer at In-Q-Tel, the U.S. intelligence community's venture capital firm. He said he was speaking outside of his official capacity.

IN-Q-TEL TROLLING. FACK... This story is going all over the place. In-Q-Tel is the CIA's venture capital wing, worth noting for those unfamiliar. They use government money to make private venture capitalists tons of profits - for example building up Keyhole into Google Earth, which, when installed on your computer phones home constantly.

See: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/in-q-tel/

In-Q-Tel - Wikipedia. Among other things: "In-Q-Tel sold 5,636 shares of Google, worth over $2.2 million, on Nov 15, 2005.[6] The stocks were a result of Google’s acquisition of Keyhole, the CIA funded satellite mapping software now known asGoogle Earth."

Exclusive: Google, CIA Invest in 'Future' of Web Monitoring | Danger Room | Wired.com: "The investment arms of the CIA and Google are both backing a company that monitors the web in real time — and says it uses that information to predict the future."

In-Q-Tel: The CIA's Tax-Funded Player In Silicon Valley : All Tech Considered : NPR && 25 Cutting Edge Companies Funded By The Central Intelligence Agency - Business Insider

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Batchez of linx follow when diving into this newest gravy train. Here is a plain setup showing a bunch of classified stuff about to go out the door to shady contractors, I'm sure none of them sketchballs with foreign intelligence angles who will sell out and use the good stuff to attack for massive profit.

DIBS ON YOUR INTERNETS: This is probably the original DIB thing now foisted on America at large, or closer to it:

www.dc3.mil/dcise/DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services Procedures.pdf
DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (DECS)

The Department of Defense (DoD) in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is actively engaged in multiple efforts to foster mutually beneficial partnerships with the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to protect DoD information residing on or passing though DIB company systems. One such effort is the DIB Cyber Security/Information Assurance (CS/IA) Program, including its optional DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (DECS) component.

Under the optional DECS component of the DIB CS/IA Program, the Government will furnish classified cyber threat and technical information either to a DIB company or to the DIB company’s Commercial Service Provider (CSP). This sensitive, Government-furnished information enables these DIB companies, or the CSPs on behalf of their DIB customers, to counter additional types of known malicious cyber activity, to further protect DoD program information.

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This is also nuts: www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/ECS_Fact_Sheet.pdf

And: Raytheon, Lockheed Get U.S. Secrets as Cybersecurity Go-Betweens

Cyber Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Obama’s Executive Order - Deloitte CIO - WSJ

Northrop, US DHS team up to support enhanced cybersecurity services :: Strategic Defence Intelligence

U.S. gives big, secret push to Internet surveillance | Politics and Law - CNET News

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Other Major Moves of Note right now: Of course the Bitcoin ecosystem got a major swipe at it from Department of Homeland Security's new uber-agency, Homeland Security Investigations. Warrant Reveals Homeland Security Seized Mt. Gox’s Dwolla Account for ‘Unlicensed Money Transmitting’ | Betabeat. I covered some key notes on the ever-spreading DHS-HSI organization in April 2012.

Associated Press situation is a big deal too. via @johnknefel: What's at Stake When the Department of Justice Seizes AP Phone Records | Politics News | Rolling Stone

Anyway I will leave it there for now. The Hack Cartel rides high today, but as with all these corrupt authoritarian bubbles they tumble sooner or later.

The Cyberwar fleet of fools will sink of its own accord, but how many innocent fishing boats will get capsized in the wake of their fooling about?

This is an incredibly short period of time, he said, and it forces a change in the relationship between DOD and other agencies. The old paradigm was to have civil partners “pull assistance” from DOD, while now DOD will actually push assistance where it is needed.

Defense.gov News Article: Official Explains New Homeland Defense/Civil Support Strategy

There is also a video here: http://www.pentagonchannel.mil/Video.aspx?videoid=285596

Mirrored: Domestic Pentagon ops expands Defense Support of Civil Authorities vs domestic extremists - YouTube

//// UPDATE 4.22.13: I forgot! Here is one version of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501. Thanx to YAN, reddit, & Cryptogon for taking note of this post! This video from the Boston metro area shows what domestic militarization of police is all about:

Also please follow PublicIntelligence.net and Cryptome.org for more handy docs. PI in particular has been pretty well on top of this.////

Mission drift into the US continues as the Pentagon contemplates dealing with "domestic extremists" under the rubric of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) - one aspect of which is the US Northern Command's "USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501".

CONPLAN 3501, This generic emergency plan is relatively easy to obtain (most of the text), but it is the "friendly" hand of the DOD compared to the more mysterious and riot-control-oriented "USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502" entitled "Civil Disturbance Operations" (CDO). This surfaced in researching the role of Northcom at the 2008 Republican National Convention, which was a very 3502 CDO style operation with National Guard controlling space on Kellogg Blvd. CONPLAN 3502 is the post-2002 version of GARDEN PLOT, the 1960s-1990s template plan for domestic military deployments, like for example in the LA Riots.

This extends the story from late 2010: Secret 'Trigger' & blueprint for emergency domestic military crackdown plan revealed | HongPong.com and reconfirms various aspects.

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Here is the new front-piece document. Also bonus weird stuff about the ever popular integration of North America.

An interesting Snippet:

Loosely-networked or individually motivated violent extremists will continue to exhort followers and encourage violent extremism in the homeland.

o HVEs will operate alone or organize in small groups and will be largely autonomous in their operations; they will have access to web-based resources to assist them in their operational planning.

o Military members and facilities will remain prominent targets of terrorists, and particularly by HVEs.

ł DoD will be called upon to provide significant resources and capabilities during a catastrophic event in the homeland.

o The National Response Framework will remain the primary instrument for applying Federal capabilities during disaster response.

And

Rapid and actionable intelligence on terrorist threats

DoD will maintain and enhance the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) as its key node for sharing intelligence with interagency partners on terrorist threats. DoD will improve and refine intelligence and information-sharing relationships that have developed since 9/11 and as a result of the Fort Hood shootings.

DoD maintains a robust array of foreign intelligence capabilities, and sharing relevant counterterrorism-related information with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and other key parties is vital to the prevention of potential terrorist threats to the homeland. JITF-CT will remain the focal point for DoD’s outreach and sharing of intelligence and information with the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Additionally, DoD will expand its participation within the various FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs),9 as well as other similar entities to maximize “top-down” and “bottom-up” sharing of key pieces of intelligence and information, consistent with applicable law and policy.

And of course, Unity of Effort and the ever popular Council of Governors:

Promote Federal-State Unity of Effort

Unity of effort between the Federal Government and States must be one of DoD’s guiding principles in the homeland, since unifying DoD’s efforts with those of its external partners improves collaboration and shortens response times for meeting life-saving needs during emergencies. Unity of effort also means greater national preparedness at less overall cost, while preserving both Federal and State constitutional requirements and responsibilities. DoD and its Federal partners must continue to strengthen unity of effort with States to define common goals regarding capabilities, structures, and processes for responses to disaster and emergencies in the homeland. The Council of Governors – established by Executive Order in 2010 – will be an essential forum for enhanced, senior-level dialogue among Federal and State civilian and military officials for this purpose.

[.....] DoD will regard dual-status commanders as the usual and customary command and control arrangement in cases where Federal military and State National Guard forces are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities within the United States.

DoD will continue to refine processes for dual-status commanders and their associated command structures. By leveraging the use of such commanders, DoD will improve Federal-State communication, economy of force, and force employment for planned events and no-notice or imminent incidents. Historic examples of the employment of dual status commanders include national special security events such as the Democratic and Republican national conventions and responses to disasters like Hurricane Sandy and wildfires in the western United States...

Vague talk of militarized domestic databases always good:

Since Federal and State military components have varying requirements for relevant information and level of detail, development of a COP solution need not specify systems, hardware, or software. Instead, it must be based on common data from authoritative military or civilian databases that flow to various systems in a common format.....

The DCE/DCO structure is reconfirmed to be key to domestic military operations:

DoD will use the planning capacity of Defense Coordinating Elements (DCEs) to expand planning cooperation at the regional level so that Departmental capabilities are considered in FEMA-led regional planning efforts. DoD will also build an integrated organizational architecture for its liaison and coordinating officers at various headquarters.

The ten FEMA regional offices are key nodes for integrating Federal plans with State and local plans, and DCEs within these regional offices are essential for operational and tactical unity of effort in an adaptive environment. This regional planning relationship bridges the gap between State-level planning conducted at a National Guard’s Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ)-State and DoD and DHS national-level planning. The JFHQs in each of the 54 States and Territoriesprovide vital ties to State emergency officials and the National Guard Bureau. This enduring synergy positions the JFHQ as the key State-level organization for integrating the emergency plans of local DoD installations with State plans and FEMA regional plans.

DoD will deepen and facilitate rigorous Federal, regional, and State-level planning, training, and exercises through coordination and liaison arrangements that support civil authorities at all levels. These arrangements include DoD liaison officers at DHS and FEMA, Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers from each Service.....

FULL DOCUMENT: Pentagon domestic ops Homeland Defense Strategy 2.2013

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Defense.gov News Article: Official Explains New Homeland Defense/Civil Support Strategy

By Jim Garamone - American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 1, 2013 – The Defense Department incorporated hard lessons learned when it codified its new homeland defense and civil support strategy, said Todd M. Rosenblum, DOD’s top homeland defense official.

In an interview with American Forces Press Service and the Pentagon Channel, Rosenblum, the acting assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas’ security affairs, said the new strategy is a recognition that the operating environment has changed.

“We face new threats, we have new vulnerabilities, we have new dependencies, most importantly we have a new way to do business,” Rosenblum said during a Pentagon interview. “We have to capture that and make sure the department is prepared and directed toward being more effective and efficient as we can be.”

The Defense Department is charged with defending the homeland from attack. U.S. Northern Command is further charged with working with state and local entities and other federal agencies to provide support in times of natural or man-made disasters. In the first instance, DOD has the lead. In the second, another federal agency -- such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency -- has the lead.

The strategy, released in February, looks at the lessons learned from past experiences -- from Hurricane Katrina through Hurricane Sandy.

They also looked at changes including the growth of communications networks, dependence on private-sector capabilities and “the rising expectations from the president and from the secretary, and certainly from the American people, that we will be prepared to provide support to civil authorities within a 24- to 48-hour window,” Rosenblum said.

This is an incredibly short period of time, he said, and it forces a change in the relationship between DOD and other agencies. The old paradigm was to have civil partners “pull assistance” from DOD, while now DOD will actually push assistance where it is needed.

“So we are postured to provide assistance as fast and rapidly as possible,” Rosenblum said.

The vast difference between the response to Katrina in 2005 and to Sandy in 2012 shows the effectiveness of the new strategy, he said.

“We were more efficient, timely and effective in our support to Hurricane Sandy,” Rosenblum said. “This is because we did integrated planning within DOD, with our federal partners, and with our state partners. We recognized the need to not wait to be called upon, but to pre-position our support capabilities knowing there’s going to be audibles and ad hoc requests.”

Planning is at the heart of the strategy, he said. Integrated planning -- with state and local officials, with other federal agencies and with non-governmental entities -- has increased visibility and prominence. The National Guard -- an organization that bridges state and federal efforts -- continues to play a crucial role. But, Rosenblum noted, the strategy recognizes that response to disasters requires an all-of-government approach.

Cyberattacks, he said, also could produce the type of man-made disaster that would require DOD assistance. The homeland defense mission codifies requirements to provide cyberdefense, he added.

“The threats to networks and critical infrastructure increase when we are engaged in operations overseas,” he said. “The physical effects of cyberattacks can impact our military operation capabilities and response capabilities.”

The fiscal environment impacts this -- and all other -- strategies.

“The sequester is real and effecting DOD through readiness, training,” Rosenblum said. “It is difficult for the department to plan and budget intelligently, when we don’t have budget certainty.”

Officials devised the strategy when the department had already committed to $487 billion in reductions over 10 years.

“Sequester has changed the calculus tremendously,” Rosenblum said. “But this strategy is not about buying new capabilities: It’s about our planning, our processes and our integration.”

////////////

Defense.gov News Release: DOD Releases Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support for Civil Authorities

U.S. Department of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=15878

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132 Public contact:

http://www.defense.gov/landing/comment.aspx

or +1 (703) 571-3343

IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 172-13

March 22, 2013

DOD Releases Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support for Civil Authorities

The Department of Defense announced today the release of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. This policyestablishes DoD’s priorities in the areas of homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities through 2020, consistent with the president’s National Security Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. It links with other DoD and national strategic documents related to missile defense, space, cyberspace, counterterrorism, and the Western Hemisphere. The strategy identifies two priority missions for the department in the homeland: defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors; and provide assistance to domestic civil authorities in the event of natural or manmade disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or catastrophic event.

The strategy emphasizes cost-effective policy mechanisms and innovative approaches to defend the homeland against direct attacks and to provide timely responses to routine and catastrophic events on U.S. territory. It stresses the continuation of DoD capabilities to defend against conventional and emerging threats in the air and maritime domains, while expanding cooperation with federal, state, and local partners to defeat asymmetric threats – including, for example, homegrown violent extremists who may seek to use improvised explosive devices. Additionally, it addresses DoD preparations for responding to man-made and natural disasters.

“The Department of Defense’s contributions to the defense of our nation have evolved over the past decade and account for new threats and challenges. Lessons learned from events like Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy and collaboration with our interagency partners and State Governors have framed our current approach to DoD civil support activities,” said Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs Todd Rosenblum. “This strategy emphasizes strengthening our partnerships with federal agencies like the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, with state and local governments, with the private sector, and with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors – not only for more comprehensive approaches to complex security challenges in the homeland, but also to create efficiencies through collaboration and joint action,”

For further information about this strategy, please access http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf

//////////

Never heard of this guy, he is the one doing the news release above. Career includes being Evan Bayh's national security staff & CIA Near East 1988-1993

Defense.gov Biography: Todd M. Rosenblum

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs [Acting?]

Todd M. Rosenblum is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. In this position, he advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. He is also responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on all matters pertaining to defense support to civil and law enforcement authorities in the homeland. Mr. Rosenblum has nearly 25 years of political, policy, and legislative experience in national security affairs.

Prior to his appointment at the Department of Defense in May 2011, Mr. Rosenblum was the Deputy Under Secretary of Intelligence for Plans, Policy, and Performance Management, Department of Homeland Security, from February 2009 to May 2011. He directed strategic and policy planning for the Department’s intelligence program, oversaw budget development and resource allocation priorities for the synchronization of intelligence programs and priorities, provided stewardship and direction for the Information Sharing Enterprise, and ensured that the intelligence program was aligned with national, departmental, and intelligence strategy and requirements.

Mr. Rosenblum was a Professional Staff Member on the Senate Intelligence Committee from March 2005 to November 2008, leading Committee oversight of Department of Defense human intelligence collection programs and Intelligence Community-wide intelligence collection programs and operations in the Middle East. Concurrently and prior to joining the Committee, he served as the Military Legislative Assistant and National Security Advisor to Senator Evan Bayh from January 2001 to November 2008, where he acted as senior counsel and represented the Senator on defense issues and foreign policy, national security legislative actions, and public affairs. He was a member of the Senior Personnel Staff, National Security Cluster, on the Obama Presidential Transition Team from November 2008 to February 2009.   

Mr. Rosenblum held several management and advisory positions at the Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from August 1994 to January 2001. From April 1999 to January 2001, he was the Executive Assistant/Chief of Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation where he provided executive management and policy liaison on the full range of nonproliferation issues. He was the Senior Foreign Affairs Advisor for Northeast Asia at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from August 1994 to April 1999, where he represented the Agency in numerous nonproliferation negotiations and regional security dialogues.

From January 1993 to August 1994, he was the Deputy Political-Military Advisor for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Mr. Rosenblum chaired an interagency export control working group, providing departmental recommendations on proposed arms sales to the region, and was responsible for ensuring consistency between national policy and regional security assistance activities. He was an Intelligence Officer in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Directorate of Intelligence, from September 1988 to January 1993.

Mr. Rosenblum has received numerous individual and group awards from the Department of State, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He received his Masters in International Affairs in 1988 from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, and his Bachelor of Arts in 1986 from Columbian College, The George Washington University.

//////////////

Anyway that should give everyone a little more to work with, given the heightened domestic military operations surrounding the Boston aftermath, it is important to get a sense of where the Pentagon sees itself going in these reactions and ongoing operations -- what happens next is another question.

A great move would be publishing the entire text of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502 Civil Disturbance Operations on the Internets immediately!

"<omg> i'm one of those horned rimmed guys sitting behind a desk in DC dreaming of ways to manipulate Anonymous for UK's and USA's purpose :)" Backtrace Security - Pastebin.com http://pastebin.com/KtLfurP1 -posted BY: A GUEST ON MAR 16TH, 2012 | SYNTAX: NONE | SIZE: 9.62 KB | HITS: 833 |

/// UPDATE OCT 23 1AM: YET ANOTHER SHADY OP with links to OpCartel material turns up! YE GODS! Even more #OpCartel related shadiness: Anonymous hive instantly rejects @FawkesSecurity feds/contractors/fools posting violent threat, false flag or buffoonery ///

Dragging a big post together here because it's a loose thing, happening in real time, with some old logs illustrating new predicaments from New Zealand to Texas. All of this post material is out in the open, not SpySquirrel material, but drifting by quick. Everything here seems pretty tenuous but might be useful to have for review. If nothing else there is kind of an old school global hacker madness tone tying this all together, hard to tell what is truthful & hype :-/ Mostly just raises a bunch of questions for further inquiry.

Wired is covering the Kim Dotcom case - one of the world's (literally) biggest cloud hosting provider CEOs taken down by the New Zealand government and FBI; the case is collapsing in court and it's been admitted that their NSA spy sigint equivalent GCSB was illegally spying on him - even the Prime Minister had to apologize. Suggested to search Topsy.com for "GCSB Surveillance" "GCSB Scandal" etc.

Checking into backstories kind of related to realtime events From New Zealand & found some new info from Decentralise Occupy (endarken) on Twitter. There was an #O20 anti-austerity protest this weekend and a complex surveillance scandal unfolding. I don't really agree with endarken's conclusions about a bunch of things, however there is a lot worth looking at. First the New Zealand Dotcom/Surveillance scandal - let's mainline some New Zealand surveillance state inside-Cricket fail - or here is a news clip running down the illegal NZ GovOps:

The problem with riding out a political controversy is that it makes it very hard to draw a line underneath it.

High profile resignations eventually allowed the Government to draw a line under the ACC mess.

Compare that to the problems Mr Dotcom is causing, which are numerous and largely unresolved. John Banks' involvement is still creating fallout, with the Prime Minister again having to back his coalition partner. This is despite revelations in a letter from Banks' lawyer that the Act leader - who repeatedly stated he had nothing to hide - was concerned about what journalists and Opposition MPs might do with his statements to the police - see: Key still backs Banks, despite letter.

Of course the actual statements are still to be revealed - another political grenade waiting to go off, even as related issues keep John Key occupied. David Shearer's claim that there was a video of the PM discussing Kim Dotcom in February clearly wasn't a knockout blow and as Patrick Gower reports, Shearer's Labour colleagues weren't exactly enthusiastic in support - see: Has Shearer's GCSB claim backfired?.

In the (un)parliamentary melee that erupted as John Key sought to correct a previous statement to the House there were no real blows landed, just some brawling that was difficult to referee - see: Jane Clifton's Smith on a hot tin roof with points-ordering. As Corin Dann points out, however, that is probably enough for the opposition at the moment: 'The fact is that the Government is now having to fight a number of fires on different fronts. It's starting to look a little rattled' - see: No 'gotcha' moment for Key.

The nature of the GCSB may also be preventing Key from dealing with the politics of the issue says Patrick Smellie: 'If lawyers are unwilling to be open about the truth, spy agencies are both obliged and pathologically inclined to withhold information. He simply can't defend himself. In the process, however, his position is eroded' - see: Trust easily lost in age of new media. However, heads may be beginning to roll at the spy agency, albeit slowly, as it appears Hugh Wolfensohn - a key player in signing off on the illegal spying of Dotcom is on 'gardening leave' - see Patrick Gower's Senior spy faces sack over Dotcom debacle.

There will undoubtedly be some gardening leave on offer soon at the Ministry of Social Development. The seriousness and scale of the problem has been underlined by the head of the Government's IT programmes being ordered to do an urgent stocktake of all public computer systems in use by government departments: - see Claire Trevett's Scramble to safeguard IT systems.

Despite denials that the Minister, her office and her department had nothing to do with the outing of Ira Bailey, suspicion remains. Not least because the Minister has a track record: 'Ms Bennett has done a similar thing in the past, releasing the weekly benefit details of a solo mother who challenged a National Party policy. Green Party co-leader Metiria Turei wants a forensic investigation of the computers in Ms Bennett's office' - see: Bennett accused of breaching privacy again. There is clear evidence that Bailey's identity was known in the Beehive. Holly Ford, a member of Ms Bennett's staff, checked out Bailey's LinkedIn profile just before it was leaked to the Herald's Claire Trevett - see: Chris Keall's LinkedIn trail leads to Bennett's office - Ng.

The independent journalist at the centre of it all wasn't impressed with his source being forced into public view, but Keith Ng will be happy with the public response to his work - over $5,500 in donations so far to support his work - see: Blogger raises donations for breaking Winz story.

KimDotcom tweets a news clip on this thing unfolding & more here. Roughly speaking @endarken says... well if i can paraphrase, between the industrial surveillance on Dotcom, the new State Dept cables and others, chunks of the overall surveillance grid are getting exposed in operations from New Zealand to the US. In New Zealand right now the Dotcom surveillance issue is really cooking!

Other things from down under & thereabouts surfacing, including the industrial-strength US-backed spying campaign against MegaUpload proprietor Kim Dotcom, a combination of stuff including Australian diplomatic cables -- cables also showing PM Gillard being noticed as friendly new Leader material for Australia with a thumbs-up from US intelligence.

False Flagging Mossad website attack: Let's get to this purported IRC log @endarken highlights from many months back, which purports to show two hacker-handlers bragging about creating Anonymous false flag operations. The first idea is that "omg" tries to have "rooster" get "zeekill" to jam the Mossad's public website enough to cause a news story -- then they joke about their previous #op false flags and jeopardizing Texas journalist Barrett Brown's life by starting the #opCartel fight between Anonymous & the Zetas Mexican drug trafficking cartel. (google that one)

This could be another spoof writing (packs rather a lot of info, srsly) but it's getting a lot of renewed interest now, if the hit counter's any indication: http://pastebin.com/KtLfurP1

<rooster> Tell me what you told him.

<omg> <omg> just get zeekill to use his BR roots to hit mossad's IP for 20 hours and i'll make sure you and zeekill are free to stroll along with no more interference from "external" parties

<omg> <omg> or if you want just 8 hours

<omg> <omg> enough to have reporters verify Mossad's tango down

<omg> i'll make sure Interpol doesn't get a red notice on him

<rooster> why.

<omg> his little panda security stunt and with #antisec hacking the site is what will get his ass hauled by SUPO to Spain

<omg> this is what i call leverage

<omg> <omg> do you know it wasn't Sabu's idea to tell Anarchaos to deliver the emails?

<rooster> yes, i know abou that.

<omg> that was my work, along with other stupid Anonymous false operations such as

<omg> #opcartel, #opglobalbackout

<rooster> Yes, that's fine. i know

<rooster> about all of that.

<rooster> i want to know

<rooster> why.

<rooster> not only, why did you do it.

<rooster> why are you now

<rooster> telling people.

<omg> <omg> i'm one of those horned rimmed guys sitting behind a desk in DC dreaming of ways to manipulate Anonymous for UK's and USA's purpose :)

<rooster> if this is true.

<rooster> give me contact information.

<omg> Anonymous never had leadership that's why it was so easy in the last 6 months

<omg> tell your handlier in NYC

<omg> he'll know

<omg> FBI plays by the books

<rooster> alright. i'll be in touch then.

<omg> however guys like me in counter intelligence don't

<rooster> you'd be surprised.

<omg> oh i know

<omg> don't worry :) i have friends in JTTF

<omg> i assume your magneto's handlier?

<omg> if so call up Philip Selton in DC he's a good friend of my

<omg> tell him 'B' is up to his old tricks

<rooster> i'll look into that. that's what i needed in the first place.

<rooster> Thanks.

<rooster> im working on something of my own, it's a bit in your department, but i need to talk to someone official about it.

<omg> trying to mitigate the Strafor email damage unfortunally

<omg> did you see the assesment?

<rooster> no i did not.

<omg> ask CT in NYC

<omg> they have it

<omg> Senate Intelligence Committee will have a briefing on it next week

<rooster> oh, i don't go to that. i have someone who gives me things i request.

<omg> prob above your clearance level

<omg> anyways you know about their little group's HTP right?

<rooster> not really. but i'm interested.

<rooster> what can you tell me?

<omg> apparently in an attempt to SE, one of their guy's zeekill ran a SYN+ACK ddos against mossad.gov.il

<rooster> oh, the mossad ddos.

<rooster> done with brazil roots, right?

<omg> yep

<omg> from what i gather it's prob CDN servers

<omg> with the bandwidth that was pumped to the site

<omg> the site is on a tier 1 backbone provider with about 1gbs of total speed

<omg> their little gang has some serious bandwidth

<rooster> i guess so. would have to be a good amount to take out something on t1

<omg> haha much faster from what i guess Mossad has

<omg> think it's on a OC-24

<rooster> well, most public sites are on small servers isolated from anything important

<omg> onto a STM-64 uplink

<omg> dunno but what that anonyroot idiot hit CIA's site was pretty high too. The uplink pipe for DC's link was a OC-24

<omg> guys in DS&T had to rotate the public ip three times

<rooster> these guys are persistent fuckers, aren't they?

<omg> well it depends

<omg> most are idiots

<omg> their Anonymous-OS already has a sudoder backdoor

<omg> i think the offical dl count is close to 34K now

<rooster> that was well known

<rooster> and obvious

<omg> about their HTP group from what's read from previous intel reports. It was a splinter group that formed after the HB Gary hack

<omg> they previously use the irc skidr.us

<omg> and apparently the group rotates irc servers monthly

<rooster> i'll be right back.

<omg> figured i should give it a try and try to use their crazy members to try and mitigate the next wikileaks release

<omg> one of them did a quick demo yestoday and was able to bring down Mossad's site

<omg> *yesterday*

<omg> btw you know Israel already caught that 0xOmar kid right?

<omg> it's embarrassing to see Israel able to catch a hacker weeks after an intrusion, while we don't have CERN teams cyber readiness level to react quickly enough to large scale attacks

<rooster> back, sorry i have two other people relaying information to me.

<rooster> reading, sec.

<rooster> hes the israeli, right?

<rooster> no

<rooster> the saudi?

<omg> they caught him in SA

<rooster> yea, the saudi.

<omg> tracked him through credit card purchases

<rooster> yes, i remember when he pastebinned some ccs

<omg> it takes about 2 weeks min to just get a search warrent your whitecollar depts + SS with the DOJ for a simple id theft

<rooster> Yes, i know.

<rooster> fraud isn't just a slap on the wrist.

<omg> yes

<omg> and it's a constant battle

<omg> with DOJ versus state level id theft charges

<omg> though it's good to know cybercrime is monitering hardchats

<rooster> yeah, there are eyes on a lot of different places right now

<omg> that's good, though i'm prob the only guy in my agency trying to figure how to not mess things up with current investigations :)

<rooster> if you can disclose, who are you with?

<omg> sorry i cannot

<rooster> understandable

<rooster> just, personal curiosity.

<omg> just contact SSA Selton

<omg> he'll understand

<rooster> right.

<omg> but i'm not with you guy's at the Bureau

<omg> in fact because of the sealed DOJ docket's, I didn't even know about Xavier Monsegur being a CI

<rooster> Should have, it was actually leaked a while back.

<rooster> also i'm with the bureau, i have to state that if you return this back to anyone.

<omg> i had track down one of your contractors Backtrace to confirm it two months ago in Jan

<rooster> i have a position similar to you.

<rooster> just so that's clear.

<rooster> i don't want break any laws while doing my job.

<omg> i just don't want to mess up any existing investigations

<omg> i thought everything is need to know. Regardless everyone has TS clearance, but certain things such as knowing who is an CI is a need to know

<omg> at the Bureau

<rooster> again, i'm not with the bureau, i do what you do.

<rooster> and it is all need to know

<rooster> but if you look closely

<rooster> you can find out a lot on your own

<omg> <rooster> also i'm with the bureau, i have to state that if you return this back to anyone.

<rooster> hah. wow.

<rooster> that is a typo.

<rooster> meant to say not. i apologize.

<omg> i'm with DS

<omg> of the DOS

<rooster> ah.

<rooster> ive interacted with the bureau

<omg> i'm the guy responsible for mitigating damage caused by Jeremy Hammond sending the Strafor emails to Wikileaks

<rooster> hammon, sounds familiar.

<rooster> um

<rooster> what does he run

<rooster> he runs something, i think.

<omg> Anarchaos aka crediblethreat aka Hack This Site founder

<omg> btw did you ever use the nick moop?

<rooster> there are a few people

<rooster> that use that nick

<omg> my suggestion work with Jennifer Emick with Backtrace

<rooster> i've not worked with backtrace directly, but i've chatted to hubris before.

<omg> i've been helping Hubris aka david with some "special projects" such as injecting fake Anonymous operations such as #opcartel

<rooster> i understand about injecting fake ops, like a honeypot

<rooster> but opcartel

<rooster> was too far

<rooster> lives could have been at risk

<omg> not really, only Barret Brown's

<omg> the goal of #opcartel was to get CISEN into iranserv

<omg> and understand the leadership structure resulted in the recent Interpol South American arrests

<omg> and anonworld

<rooster> ah, so you're planting fake ops, to infiltrate.

<rooster> smart.

<omg> #opglobalbackout was a response by that anonyroot's idiot ddos of CIA.gov

<omg> so the NSA could argue for stronger monitering + domestic intelligence

<omg> inject stories such as: http://pastebin.com/pVmAZqWY

<rooster> so is that new internet monitoring bill related at all to OpDarknet?

<omg> opdarknet?

<rooster> also

<rooster> i dont tink

<omg> no it's because of the constant threat of China

<rooster> there is any validity

<rooster> in that pastebin

<omg> + guys like pr0f_srs's dump of the SCADA system

<rooster> i understand SCADA system dumps.

<rooster> how does china play into that?

<omg> and a simple ddos to CIA.gov is enough to invoke the "terrorism" arguement

<rooster> anything is enough to invoke the terrorism card

<rooster> it's so vague, it can be thrown around until it sticks.

<omg> when you have critical US infracture such as a Water Pump Facility, or your Intelligence Agency being under attack?

<rooster> why do you think the reason for monitoring the occupy movement, and various protesters was under a counter-terrorism effort?

<omg> how do you think Counter-Intelligence feels?

<rooster> i think they would feel like they need to step it up.

<rooster> and that's where you come in, correct?

<omg> yep

<omg> been doing the injections and manipulation of Anonymous' agenda at the sidelines to push for stronger FBI + NSA prescence

<omg> not everyone in DSS agrees with me

<omg> but when the head of the FBI + NSA is making these arguements to the National Security Council

<omg> ^-- Director

<omg> i've said i've did a good job in the last 5 months :)

<rooster> opcartel, an globalblackout were well recognized, i guess that means you're right

<omg> i'm not involved with Intelligence gathering of Occupy

<omg> it's the boys that are with DHS

<omg> then again they over-react to everything

<rooster> nor am i, but i've a few contacts of mine are.

<omg> shit like Anonymous hackers fucking up train lines?

<omg> yea... DHS your idiots

End of log. This log could be fake or partially fake but it draws a classic picture.

[Side note - the planted story they mention - http://pastebin.com/pVmAZqWY - is a rather silly "message for Anonymous from Mossad" which I remember thinking of as really silly...(BY: A GUEST ON FEB 12TH, 2012 | SYNTAX: NONE | SIZE: 12.71 KB | HITS: 12,109 | EXPIRES: NEVER) ]

Speculating but DSS could be Defense Security Service - http://www.dss.mil/ - which has a purview of defending the Defense Industrial Base generally & that could involve efforts to catch hackers eh? It is a military agency with responsibility for aspects of guarding private contractor installations, so they would seem to have an Interface or 2 to domestic political monitoring. DSS definitely scans websites a lot & shows up in logs but has virtually no public or alt-researcher profile at all. What kinds of programs have they been up to in this exciting era? etc. [Also could be State Diplomatic Security Service but I doubt it - or the odd DOJ Domestic Security Section but that dissolved in 2009 into (this is not a TV show probably): Criminal Division: the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section.

Any place run from Quantico AND bonus Fort Meade DISCO Summary from their site:

About Us

The Defense Security Service (DSS) is an agency of the Department of Defense(DoD) located in Quantico, Virginia with field offices throughout the United States. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence provides authority, direction and control over DSS. DSS provides the military services, Defense Agencies, 24 federal agencies and approximately 13,300 cleared contractor facilities with security support services.

DSS contributes to national security by serving as an interface between the government and cleared industry. DSS administers and implements the defense portion of the National Industrial Security Program pursuant to Executive Order 12829. Approximately 356 Industrial Security Representatives provide oversight and assistance to cleared contractor facilities and assist management and Facility Security Officers in ensuring the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information. DSS also facilitates classified shipments between the United States and foreign countries and implements foreign ownership, control and influence countermeasures.

The Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE) is located in Linthicum, Md., and provides security education and training to DoD security professionals through formal classroom and distributed learning methodologies (i.e., computer-based, web-based and tele-training).

The Defense IndustrialSecurity Clearance Office (DISCO), located in Fort Meade, Md., processes requests for industrial personnel security investigations and provides eligibility or clearance determinations for cleared industry personnel under the NISP.

OMG's comment on DHS - Homeland Security, collecting info on Occupy could have been related to the Critical Infrastructure stuff similar to DSS activities (as well as Federal Protective Service which has been the main FOIA released docs so far).

The Pastebin he references as a lol fake OMG - it's this crazy absurd Mossad threat missive that got tons of views at the time: http://pastebin.com/pVmAZqWY

//// Below the fold - more logs - coverage on the DOJ's system of illegal operations and signaling to cartels, and other loosely related elements ////

All right I gotta be a bit raw in the formatting here... Just had a good talk for an hour with Alex Jones on the afternoon radio show.

Also some good news, Zuccotti Park is reoccupied today - see http://globalrevolution.tv for live feed mixes!

//// UPDATE 8PM: I forgot COINTELPRO GOTHIC 1 & 2: FBI files from Iowa showing domestic operations: 2010 - http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2010/10/13/cointelpro-gothic-docs-prove... // 2012 - http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2012/03/01/exclusive-cointelpro-gothic-... ////

I will add a quick note about Wall Street crime, how about you guys investigate this?! http://www.ourfuture.org/blog-entry/2012072809/evidence-mounts-dc-inside...

Previous posts on this site: London riots spurred CONPLAN 3502 awareness due to Marc Ambinder on Twitter: http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2011/08/15/after-london-riots-internets...
The big story on CONPLAN 3502 I published in November 2010: http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2010/11/20/tc-indymedia-exclusive-secre...
The story I posted last Thursday night that went relatively viral about the MP training: http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2012/07/06/warning-shot-will-not-be-fir...

Most of the recent goodies can be found on http://publicintelligence.net/ including:
Plan summary: http://publicintelligence.net/norad-and-northcom-operations-plans-summary/
This is very crucial, 2011 edition of Domestic Operations JAG law handbook, chapter 5 has tons of cites: http://publicintelligence.net/domestic-operational-law-2011/
^ this one also shows how (S)ECRET CONPLAN 3502 Civil Disturbance Operations is based on GARDEN PLOT and how the Joint Chiefs of Staff also has a (S)ECRET classified rules for domestic use of force directive. There is a 2010 edition of this manual as well with roughly the same info - follow links in this story for that.

My friend Kaye Beach (Axxiom for Liberty, twitter @axxiom ) loaded the docs onto Scribd. Her account got nuked by the admins for being too awesome I think, however the collection of files is still alive for convenience here: http://www.scribd.com/collections/2728955/CONPLAN-3501-3502-NORTHCOM-NLE...

Here is a partially declassified CONPLAN 3591 for pandemic influenza:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/59158197/USNORTHCOM-CONPLANpandemicFlu-2009
This is also available at http://www.northcom.mil/FOIA/docs/10-F-0279%20Final%20Response.pdf
CRS report on pandemic flu: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40619.pdf
For all matters flu related, CIDRAP at the U of M is awesome for details: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/index.html

More on domestic mil ops: one report: http://publicintelligence.net/northcom-hd-cs-cba-study-plan/
Various military detention & training materials - includes international as well as domestic stuff:
http://publicintelligence.net/usamps-epw-ci-policy-operations/
http://publicintelligence.net/usamps-detainee-policy/
http://publicintelligence.net/usamps-civil-disturbance-operations/ - this spurred the big discussion
http://publicintelligence.net/loc-analysis-of-msca/

Old versions of the GARDEN PLOT are available via http://governmentattic.org .

BTW The DARPA disinformation "fog" program! http://publicintelligence.net/darpa-fog-computing/

I gotta run for now but please check out the documents and remember that if you can raise awareness of these issues you can create political cover for more people including elected and appointed officials to resist the expansion and execution of these authoritarian schemes!

Latest: Drone blitz on Pakistan enters third straight day | World news | guardian.co.uk - up to 27 people dead in strikes that began on Saturday. The US has jeopardized its Afghanistan campaign by refusing to apologize for the November 2011 cross-border 'friendly fire' incident which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. (Also: Drone wars and state secrecy – how Barack Obama became a hardliner | World news | The Observer)

We are sleepwalking into the Drone Age, unaware of the consequences:

Then, three days later, the CIA announced that it had eliminated "four militants". In truth there were only two victims: Tariq had been driving his 12-year-old cousin to their aunt's house when the Hellfire missile killed them both. This came just 24 hours after the CIA boasted of eliminating six other "militants" – actually, four chromite workers driving home from work. In both cases a local informant apparently tagged the car with a GPS monitor and lied to earn his fee.

Sounds familiar...

Yemen sets sail for fail: U.S. drone targets in Yemen raise questions - The Washington Post -- killing people that have not even a trace of evidence of any plot against the United States. But perhaps in the aftermath their relatives will...

The appalling news of the Obama Kill List -- reminiscent of LBJ's riffling through aerial photographs to select bombing targets in Vietnam, the archetypal example of losing any control over strategy for the addiction to powerful, violent tactics -- has disturbed many but also illustrated the sick hypocrisy of the mainstream 'left' in our country. If Cheney and the gang were up to this, they would be up in arms, but now you don't get a peep. Shocked I tell you.

I sent all kinds of tweets last weekend to press and attendees at the 2012 DFL State Convention to see if I could get any responses about the drone kill list, and none of these jokers had the gumption to even answer me. No one's touching kill lists this year with a ten foot pole. However I did net a few mainstream liberal twitter followers, silent and cowardly on the important issues they may be.

See also a bunch of shilling, summarized: The Media on Obama’s ‘Kill List’ | The Dissenter

As usual, the tactic itself is of course destined to backfire and create generational-scale hatred of our country. This is one of those "doomed to repeat it" things the military-industrial complex is so goddamned good at -- it's almost like their business model depends on perpetual violence. Clever heads are recognizing this: It may seem painless, but drone war in Afghanistan is destroying the West's reputation - Telegraph (UK)

Supporters of drones – and they make up practically the entire respectable political establishment in Britain and the US – argue that they are indispensable in the fight against al-Qaeda. But plenty of very experienced voices have expressed profound qualms. The former army officer David Kilcullen, one of the architects of the 2007 Iraqi surge, has warned that drone attacks create more extremists than they eliminate. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Britain’s former special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is equally adamant that drone attacks are horribly counter-productive because of the hatred they have started to generate: according to a recent poll, more than two thirds of Pakistanis regard the United States as an enemy. Britain used to be popular and respected in this part of the world for our wisdom and decency. Now, thanks to our refusal to challenge American military doctrine, we are hated, too.

Anyway I wanted to share the full text of Eye of the drone (Harper's Magazine) because it's one of those pieces which ought to reach through the shells of indifference to state violence we all build up - it cuts right to the sick nature of the decade we live in.

Thanks to Harper's for getting this piece out there -- for those that died and were deemed terrorists for their proximity to targets, "up to no good" because they gathered in their own communities to work on their problems.

From statements made in February by the families of victims and survivors of a March 17, 2011, drone attack in the village of Datta Khel in the Pakistani region of North Waziristan. The statements were collected by the British human rights group Reprieve and were included in their lawsuit challenging the legal right of the British government to aid the United States in its drone campaign. More than half of all deaths from U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan have occurred in North Waziristan. Translated from the Pashto.

I am approximately forty-six years old, though I do not know the exact date of my birth. I am a malice of my tribe, meaning that I am a man of responsibility among my people. One of my brother’s sons, Din Mohammed, whom I was very fond of, was killed by a drone missile on March 17, 2011. He was one of about forty people who died in this strike. Din Mohammed was twenty-five years old when he died. These men were gathered together for a jirga, a gathering of tribal elders to solve disputes. This particular jirga was to solve a disagreement over chromite, a mineral mined in Waziristan. My nephew was attending the jirga because he was involved in the transport and sale of this mineral. My brother, Din Mohammed’s father, arrived at the scene of the strike shortly following the attack. He saw death all around him, and then he found his own son. My brother had to bring his son back home in pieces. That was all that remained of Din Mohammed.

I saw my father about three hours before the drone strike killed him. News of the strike didn’t reach me until later, and I arrived at the location in the evening. When I got off the bus near the bazaar, I immediately saw flames in and around the station. The fires burned for two days straight. I went to where the jirga had been held. There were still people lying around injured. The tribal elders who had been killed could not be identified because there were body parts strewn about. The smell was awful. I just collected the pieces of flesh that I believed belonged to my father and placed them in a small coffin.

The sudden loss of so many elders and leaders in my community has had a tremendous impact. Everyone is now afraid to gather together to hold jirgas and solve our problems. Even if we want to come together to protest the illegal drone strikes, we fear that meeting to discuss how to peacefully protest will put us at risk of being killed by drones.

The first time I saw a drone in the sky was about eight years ago, when I was thirteen. I have counted six or seven drone strikes in my village since the beginning of 2012. There were sixty or seventy primary schools in and around my village, but only a few remain today. Few children attend school because they fear for their lives walking to and from their homes. I am mostly illiterate. I stopped going to school because we were all very afraid that we would be killed. I am twenty-one years old. My time has passed. I cannot learn how to read or write so that I can better my life. But I very much wish my children to grow up without these killer drones hovering above, so that they may get the education and life I was denied.

The men who died in this strike were our leaders; the ones we turned to for all forms of support. We always knew that drone strikes were wrong, that they encroached on Pakistan’s sovereign territory. We knew that innocent civilians had been killed. However, we did not realize how callous and cruel it could be. The community is now plagued with fear. The tribal elders are afraid to gather together in jirgas, as had been our custom for more than a century. The mothers and wives plead with the men not to congregate together. They do not want to lose any more of their husbands, sons, brothers, and nephews. People in the same family now sleep apart because they do not want their togetherness to be viewed suspiciously through the eye of the drone. They do not want to become the next target.

Bonus points: Steve Clemons: What Happens When They Get Drones?