EU at an end?!

The French and Dutch resoundingly rejected the European Union Constitution, a baffling document of about 400 parts. The Union is in Crisis and the Trade Federation and its droid army are lookin for trouble. Anger spreads. Chirac looks like a caricature of himself. Looking over this document, I think I found a snag that your everyday European nationalist finds objectionable:

Article II-15: Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work
1. Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation.
2. Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State.
3. Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.

And so essentially the French don't want Turkish Muslims to be able to move into their country in huge numbers, shocking as that may be. European nationalism is still a Potent Force to Contend With, even in the 21st century. I got a email from Stratfor.com about the very subject:

[The growing hostility to EU unity] is a dramatic shift in Europe. During the 1990s, the emergence of a transnational European state appeared to be a foregone conclusion. The introduction of the euro seemed to make this inevitable. The new currency made it possible to place control of Europe's money supply in the hands of a transnational central bank. It made little sense to have a European currency without a European state -- it was like wearing a tie without a shirt. Therefore, since at least part of Europe accept the euro with relative ease, it appeared to follow that the framing document -- a constitution -- would readily follow.

But there is a huge difference in the ways political systems function in relatively prosperous times and in more austere times. Things that are acceptable when the economy is healthy become less tolerable -- or intolerable -- when the economy is weak. This does not mean that the primary issue is economic. The chief obstacle to an EU constitution in France and elsewhere is political and social -- it is the unwillingness to abandon sovereignty. This sensibility is always there, but it is activated when the political ambitions of the new regime interact with hard times. This is doubly the case when people believe that their own problems and votes might have no bearing on the actions or policies of the new political system.

This dilemma is symbolized by the nature of the new constitution -- it is 300 pages long. A constitution must define the regime. It must define institutions and the limits on those institutions. It must define individual rights and, in a federal system, the rights of nonfederal governments. Above all, it must be terse. The more complex it is, the less the ordinary citizen can trust it.

A 300-page constitution, by dint of its very size, sums up the first problem facing Europe: The EU is governed by a bureaucracy whose ways cannot be understood by ordinary citizens, and which does not intend itself to be understood. It is therefore not trusted. A second problem is that the constitution is made up of a series of staggeringly complex compromises that defy clear understanding. If American constitutional law is complex, European constitutional law, as written, is beyond comprehension, let alone debate.

The voters simply don't know what they are voting for. Even if they did favor the principle of European unification, no one really knows, under this constitution, precisely what they would be committing to. This is not a solvable problem. The complexity is inevitable. It derives from an understanding of Europe that relies on specialists rather than citizen-politicians, and an uneasiness among nations that has resulted in a compromise of bewildering complexity. The Europeans either have an incomprehensible constitution, or they have no chance of agreeing on one at all.

Beneath the complexity of the task lies politics.

There were two reasons for creating the EU. The first was to build institutions that would prevent a fourth war between France and Germany. The catastrophic record of European statesmanship created the impulse to tie the hands of European politicians by creating overarching institutions. In other words, transnationalism was designed to overcome Europe's ruinous nationalism.

Second, the European Union, and the European Community before it, were designed to facilitate European prosperity. It was reasonably assumed that a Europe without protectionist barriers would do better than a Europe fragmented into multiple, exclusionary markets. On this level, the EU had a purely utilitarian goal: It was designed for economic ends, and the only justification for its existence was how readily it achieved those ends and how universally it could distribute those benefits across national lines. The European Union was designed to allow Europe to be competitive in the global marketplace.

Preventing war and generating prosperity are not trivial goals, but they lack the moral drive possessed by the great revolutionary regimes -- France, the United States, the Soviet Union. What binds the EU together is a dream of peace and prosperity. One might argue that this is a more reasonable goal than "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite." But it is also judged by a different standard: It is possible to sacrifice all to "Workers of the World Unite" or "We hold these truths to be self-evident ." But a regime founded on the principles of safety and prosperity cannot demand sacrifice that threatens either. The idea of a united Europe is not a moral project -- it is a mutually beneficial contract that has no moral hold once those benefits are no longer safeguarded.

This gives the idea of Europe a fundamental fragility. A political system that has no basis on which to justify hardship cannot endure hardship, and hardship is the one certainty that comes to all regimes. In this immediate case, Europe -- or at least France, Germany and Italy, the center of gravity of Europe -- is in serious economic trouble. Growth has slowed to only 1.5 percent per year while unemployment has climbed into the double digits. For these three countries, the EU model is simply not delivering on prosperity.
[....]
The reason [for French opposition] has to do with the first goal of the European system -- security. The old threat to security was a continuation of Europe's wars. But now a new threat -- immigration -- is perceived. Immigration appears threatening on two levels: Economically, it increases competition for jobs; socially, it increases diversity. From an economist's point of view, job competition increases efficiency, while social diversity is a non-quantifiable irrelevancy. They miss the point, to say the least.
[.....]
There is a deeper level to this. France is France. France was very happy to go to Algeria and declare it "France." Its people have been much less happy to have Algerians come to France and declare it "Algeria." Whatever the irony of it, France is changing demographically, with the inevitable result that many French -- particularly those outside the corporate elite -- don't want their country to change. Even more to the point, some feel that they are losing control of their country to immigrants, and that they no longer have the sovereign right to determine the kind of society they will have.

The EU constitution institutionalizes that powerlessness. The doctrines embedded in the EU recognize the right of immigration from one country to another: Once you have citizenship somewhere, you have the right to go anywhere within the union. This might make sense from an economist's view of labor markets, but it means that France no longer controls its fate. When Turkey enters the EU, the perception is, an avalanche of Muslim immigrants will sweep France, and the European government's bureaucrats will celebrate the shift instead of stopping it. The guarantees of security are being kept in preventing nation-states from fighting, but not -- it is perceived -- in protecting the traditional way of life in France and other countries.

...The deeper issue is sovereignty. The government of France is asking its people essentially to transfer major elements of sovereignty to a state that France cannot control. The French do not see a common identity with the rest of Europe, and the rest of Europe does not see a common identity with France. The EU is rooted in an alliance of convenience that is rapidly becoming inconvenient.

Well hopefully the Illuminati at Stratfor will not be too furious that i pulled a major quote out. Oh well. It's the information age and if you aren't pissing off a private intelligence corporation, what are you really getting done?

Consider this libertarian argument about the decline of centralized power structures:

The top-down, command-and-control machinery of state power has run head-on into the forces of spontaneity and autonomy that are life’s processes. Vertical systems of centralized power are being replaced by horizontal patterns of interconnectedness. Coercion is giving way to cooperation; the pyramid is collapsing into networks; Ozymandias’ rigid structures are eroding into formless but flexible systems, with names such as "Google," "Yahoo," "WebCrawler" and "Mozilla," that mock the solemnity we once gave to the dying forms.

Efforts to understand the dynamics underlying transformations in our world have produced the studies known as "chaos" and "complexity." Along with earlier theories of quantum mechanics, the mechanistic and reductionist model of society as a "giant clockwork" to be directed by state authorities toward desired and predictable ends, has been dealt a fatal blow. We now have ideas to help us enunciate what we earlier knew intuitively, namely, that a complex world is too unpredictable to become subject to state planning; that social conflict and disorder are the necessary consequences of interfering with spontaneous systems of order.

Decades before "chaos theory" became a popular buzzword, the late Leopold Kohr had an insight into how the increased size of political systems correlated with the expansion of warfare and repression. In his book, The Breakdown of Nations, Kohr developed what he called the "size theory of social misery." In his view, "wherever something is wrong, something is too big." It is inevitable, he goes on, for large state systems to "sweep up [a] critical quantity of power" where "the mass becomes so spontaneously vile that . . . it begins to produce a quantum of its own." A reading of both Kohr and Randolph Bourne flesh out the dynamics that led the latter to observe that "war is the health of the state."

Our biological history should have informed us of the allometric principle that the appropriate size of any body is relative to the nature of the organism. A fifty-foot tall woman may make for amusing science fiction, but an eight foot, eleven inch Robert Wadlow was unable to live beyond his twenty-second year. Likewise, the massive size of the dinosaurs did not provide them sufficient resiliency to adapt to the environmental changes brought about, presumably, by the earth’s collision with a comet. In Kohr’s words, "[o]nly relatively small bodies . . . have stability. Below a certain size, everything fuses, joins, or accumulates. But beyond a certain size, everything collapses or explodes."

A European Union is a futile effort on the part of the established, institutional order to resist the changes that are dismantling its power structures. In much the same way that the Bush administration’s empire-motivated "war on terror" is a cover for trying to shore up the collapsing foundations of a centrally-managed society, the EU may be the last hurrah of men and women who are driven by unquenched appetites for power over others.

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